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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. LIMITS OF EXCLUSIVELY MEASURES BASED PROTECTION 
SYSTEMS  
The widespread inability to obtain stable safety behavior leads, as first consequence, to 
think up more and more technology-based remedies. Many instruments and devices 
adopted by the companies have simply the purpose to physically prevent the occurrence 
of risk behavior. On the other hand many other devices are designed to prevent the 
consequences or limit the damage due to the human factor. Despite the gradual adoption 
of these devices, whose effectiveness for safety cannot and should not be 
underestimated, there are still more than hundreds of thousands of workers every year 
who continue to be victims of incidents with a negative trend which is very little 
satisfactory in relation to the effort expended. The reasons for this partial failure are 
mainly two. The increased safety offered by technology can be nullified by subsequent 
more reckless behavior: who drives safer cars tends to travel at higher speeds and to pay 
less attention. The presence of an anti falls tool can sometimes lead to walk with greater 
ease on the edge of the cliff, and so on. In the current socio-economic situation a 100 
percent based on technology safety has often to compete with the economic business 
indicators. When the revenue of a company is reduced, the noble forces that push in the 
direction of strong attention to safety risk to be overwhelmed by those that push in the 
opposite direction: when company is about to fall below the break-even point, formation, 
the renewal of the headquarters, advertising and often even the safety become secondary 
to face the need to make ends meet or to maintain employment. 
Organizations must find creative ways to increase employee involvement for safety. For 
example, one Virginia company used funds it had budgeted to purchase safety posters 
and gave it to select employees via a poster design contest. Specifically, the site shut 
down all operations for two hours and brought in all employees to create their own safety 
posters. Prizes were given out for first ($100), second ($50) and third place ($25) as voted 
by employees. The company provided flipchart pages and markers/crayons and 
employees were allowed to make as many posters as they wanted. The winning poster 
was created by a maintenance worker who drew Forrest Gump running down the road 
wearing safety glasses (and other PPE) under the caption, “Safety IS as Safety DOES.” 
Completed posters were displayed around the facility. According to the safety director, the 
posters helped increase employees’ awareness for safety. 
In another example, a company in West Virginia was struggling to increase employee 
participation in completing environmental audits and behavioral observation cards. At the 
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time, only about 1 in 5 employees regularly completed these tasks. The company decided 
to donate $0.10 for each completed card to the local Boys’ Club. A safety committee 
member reported that within six months the company had donated nearly $40,000 and 
participation rates had climbed to nearly 90 percent. This means employees were 
observing and providing each other safety feedback at much higher rates than before the 
new initiative. Those involved believe that this improvement would lead to safety culture 
improvements and reduced injuries (although site-specific injury data are not available). 
These results suggest that special programs focused on community service and family 
can help to increase employee involvement for safety (Krause, Seymour, Sloat, 1999; 
Sulzer-Azaroff, Austin, 2000). 
Other organizations emphasize wellness programs. For example, a company in California 
conducts regular safety fairs where employees go (with their families) to sample healthy 
food, and receive back and foot massages and various health checks (e.g., blood 
pressure, cholesterol). This organization also has a state-of-the-art gymnasium and offers 
employees incentives to use it. In addition, the company plays new-age music every two 
hours. For 2 to 3 minutes, employees stop what they are doing and stretch (to combat 
fatigue and repetitive motion injuries). When the music stops, employees return to work. 
Although this program is fairly new, those involved believe that these efforts could help to 
reduce repetitive motion injuries in the future. 
Mentoring between experienced and inexperienced employees can also facilitate 
employee engagement in safety. This is especially true when companies have large 
numbers of retiring employees who may (or may not) pass on their detailed, craft 
knowledge to new hires. Also, many companies no longer backfill these positions, which 
leaves remaining employees to do more work with fewer people. To formalize mentoring, 
one organization implemented a buddy-for-a-week system. In this system, an experienced 
employee (one with high job knowledge and a good safety attitude) spent one week with a 
new hire, working together, having lunch, etc. According to a safety committee member at 
this facility, the process helped to pass on job-specific knowledge, provide hands-on 
training and improve rapport between newer and older employees. The safety committee 
member also believes the company’s safety culture has improved as a result of this effort, 
although he was unsure whether injury numbers had improved during this time. 
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1.2. FROM ITALIAN LEGISLATION TO BEHAVIORAL BASED SAFETY 
When we talk about workplace safety, as required by Legislative Decree 81/2008, many 
have stressed the critical importance of information and training activities of workers and 
the need for a well-organized prevention system, possibly set by the rules of Safety 
Management Systems (UNI-INAIL or OHSAS 18001). It is known that the Occupational 
Health and Safety Management System (OHS) synergistically integrate policies and 
objectives for health and safety and is therefore widely believed that should find their 
specific application in the design and management of occupational and production 
systems, as the management of occupational health and safety is a core part of the 
general management of the company. Only thanks to an innovative and systemic vision it 
is possible to effectively afford the problems of a sector so wide, complex and 
multidisciplinary as occupational safety and to get results and targets. It is too common 
among companies a formal approach to this issue: the entire process, seen as an 
imposition rather than a cultural process, is reduced to the implementation of mere 
dictates of current legislation that can only bring to unsatisfactory results in still high costs. 
This is certainly one of the reasons why there are still many difficulties in implementation 
on the spread of OHS Management Systems as prerequisite for the promotion of safety 
culture in the workplace and irreplaceable elements of the process of organizational 
renewal that companies are required to make (Peterson, 1984). The opportunity for an 
innovative approach to safety management and the need for checking results are now two 
conditions for any reality that really wants to apply the provisions of current regulations 
about occupational safety. The starting point for any activity in the field of occupational 
safety is the behavior of the worker, the so-called human factor, and the way you can 
influence it through training and adoption of appropriate strategies. If you share the 
definition of education as the acquisition of specific theoretical and practical skills that 
allow to think and act safely, it is clear that main target of training is to get a change in the 
behavior of workers so that they think and act safely: make that means not only to 
implement the rules and principles of occupational health, safety and hygiene, but also 
build new scales of values and new behavior. Behavioral Based Safety (BBS) improves 
safety behavior at work with the aim of reducing the influence of human error in the 
dynamics of accidents. BBS is based on evidence that all behavior at work can be evoked 
by physical stimulations immediately antecedent (warning signs and optical/acoustic 
signals), but are strongly influenced by the stimulations immediately consequence (co-
workers jokes mocking). In a nutshell, BBS allows you to apply Skinner’s paradigm of 
Operant Conditioning in safety (Skinner, 1953), by adopting a procedure consists of the 
following steps: 
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 identification of desirable behavior; 
 assessment to evaluate effectiveness of the intervention; 
 functional analysis of different behavior (identification of the causes); 
 application of new and different contingencies (antecedents or, more frequently, 
consequent) to get the change of observed parameters; 
 adoption of strategies for the maintenance of results over time. 
 
1.3. SAFETY BASICS 
Improving safety is often difficult, partly because of past success and most businesses 
and industries today have excellent safety records. The problem with this high level of 
safety is the complacency that it often creates. Employees can shortcut a safety 
procedure, yet rarely get hurt. Behaviorally, therefore, many of them view the slight 
probability of suffering an injury as not significant enough to maintain 100 percent 
compliance with safety procedures. The reduced likelihood of an injury often simply does 
not offset the immediate comfort, convenience, or time saving associated with an unsafe 
shortcut. But the behavioral results are predictable for many companies. The overall 
frequency of unsafe acts remains too high and safety incidents that include serious 
injuries continue at a statistically predictable rate. 
Most companies have embraced the following programs and initiatives to improve 
compliance with safety procedure: 
 informal feedback on complying with safety procedures 
 safety meetings and training 
 safety awards 
 safety audits 
 written procedures 
 special initiatives (posters, newsletters, off-the-job safety programs, etc.) 
All these procedures are important to a successful safety program. Done properly, the 
elements contribute to good safety performance. But today, these elements define 
average safety efforts, they are what everyone does. If a company does them well, it will 
achieve an average level of safety for the industry (Geller, 1998). Although the rate of 
injuries will be affected by the consistency of these efforts, the result will basically be 
normal variation above and below the industry average: some years better than average, 
some years worse. The achievement of a constant level of excellence in safety requires a 
management capacity far superior to that which the majority of companies is able to 
obtain with traditional methods. DuPont, world's fourth largest chemical company, and 
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other contexts research show that 80-90% of accidents are the result of unsafe actions 
rather than unsafe conditions; it follows that there are very few companies able to achieve 
a good level of compliance with its safety standards by adopting current methods. New 
research demonstrate efficacy of a behavioral approach to safety able to ensure a high 
degree of adhesion to the procedures with a remarkable reduction of accidents. There are 
several cases of companies that have initially adopted traditional safety methods and then 
are passed to behavior based methods. An example is the one obtained in the 80's by a 
big drilling company in the United States that has reduced by 48% the rate of accidents 
recorded according to the criteria of Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA). Another case study is about a chemical company, whose accident rate was 
similar to most industries, but it turned out in fact halved after applying a BBS system. A 
final example is a division of a large oil company that reached a level zero accidents for 
three consecutive years with a great improvement over the previous six years with the 
introduction of a system of mutual observation between co-workers in the workplace 
(McSween, 2002). 
 
1.4. DUPONT’S SUCCESS 
Formal studies of all lost-workday cases that DuPont experienced over a 10-year period 
suggested that 96 percent of Du Pont’s injuries resulted from unsafe acts rather than 
unsafe conditions (McSween, 1995). Their study supported findings from 1929 that 
suggested 88 percent of all injuries were a result of unsafe actions by employees rather 
than unsafe conditions (Heinrich, 1959). DuPont’s data lend credibility to Heinrich’s work, 
even though various authors later criticized his methodology. Based on these results, 
DuPont refined its approach to safety into its present Safety Training Observation 
Program (STOP) (McSween, 1995). DuPont promotes STOP extensively both within and 
outside the company. STOP involves a process of layered safety audits in which each 
layer of management conducts a regular safety audit, typically every week. A manager 
enters an area and finds its superintendent; then they conduct a safety audit on that area. 
On a different week, the superintendent chooses an area supervisor and they conduct a 
safety audit. Further, all management personnel conduct a formal audit each week in one 
of the work areas for which they are responsible while also conducting informal 
observations of both safety practices and safe work conditions at all times. As they 
conduct the periodic audits, managers and supervisors complete STOP cards to 
document any unsafe acts they have observed, though not documenting the names of the 
observed employees. However, as soon as convenient, they approach an employee who 
performed and unsafe act and ask two question. The first is a “What could happen?” 
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question that prompts the employee to identify which of the observed actions created the 
risk of an accident. The second is a “How could you do the job safely?” question that 
prompts the employee to identify to do just that. Along with STOP, DuPont strongly 
emphasizes the importance of safety in many other ways. The company has extensive 
safety training materials to support safety meetings and planning, such as take Two, a 
safety program that encourages employees to take two minutes to consider the safety 
aspects of each job before beginning work. It tracks off-the-job injuries and conducts 
formal off-the-job safety programs and training. Also a formal procedure, any lost workday 
due to a safety accident prompts a site visit from an executive of the company who 
personally reviews the accident investigation and interviews all personnel involved in the 
accident. Informally, employees’ safety records follow them throughout their DuPont 
careers. These elements combine to create a safety culture that routinely results in the 
safety performance. DuPont is usually number one in safety in the chemical industry, and 
historically it has frequently been twice as good as the next safest company. Although 
DuPont’s safety record is very good, the average for the entire chemical industry is also 
very good. The industry average shows that a chemical plant employee has a very low 
probability of getting hurt. On the basis of chance, a chemical industry employee will suffer 
an injury accident on the average of once in every 30 years of work. By the same 
measure, a DuPont employee will suffer an injury requiring medical treatment on the 
average of once in every 100 years. These low probabilities of injury comprise part of 
what makes further safety improvements such a challenge (Howe, 2000). 
Confirming DuPont data, many studies suggest that in most organizations behavior 
contributes to between 86 and 96 percent of all injuries (Petersen, 2001). 
 
Figure 1.1 
These data are not meant to suggest that employees are directly to blame for 96 percent 
of their injuries. From the perspective of behavioral psychology, all behavior is a function 
of the environment in which it occurs. Unsafe work behavior is accordingly the result of (1) 
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the physical environment, (2) the social environment, and (3) workers’ experience within 
these (McSween, 2003). Furthermore when we examined serious injuries and fatalities, 
we found them almost always in the category of “behavior and conditions”. That is, serious 
injuries and fatalities most often result from a combination of unsafe behavior and unsafe 
conditions (Brauer, 2006). Safety professionals often talk about a chain of events leading 
to an injury. Some of the links in the chain are behavior, some are conditions, and we can 
often prevent injuries by breaking any on the links. 
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1.5. SAFETY TRIANGLE 
 
Figure 1.2 
Complacency refers to the loss of the fear of injury that typically motivates employees to 
work safely. DuPont’s emphasis on unsafe acts recognizes the hierarchy commonly 
represented by the safety triangle in figure. Since H. W. Heinrich identified an accident 
ratio of 1 major injury to 29 minor injuries to 300 near misses in the context of the 
workplace, the safety triangle has become the accepted illustration for the relationship 
between near misses, minor accidents and major accidents at work, but what it really tells 
us is that rather than looking at the rare major accidents, we need to concentrate on the 
near misses, the value of the triangle really is all about that base (Heinrich, 1959). So 
what does the safety triangle tell us? Simply put, rather than starting at the top and 
working down, we should look at the bottom and work up. The research carried out by 
Heinrich, and by subsequent analysts with an interest in this area, showed that the safety 
triangle can be extended to include a base of up to 300.000 at risk behavior, such as 
failing to comply with safety procedures, for every 1 fatality. The key issue here is that 
effectively tackling and reducing the size of the base, the huge number of minor breaches 
of safety procedure, these at risk behavior occurring in the workplace, leads to a reduction 
in the likelihood of that one terrible fatal injury (and, as well, the accidents and minor 
injuries that also occur also in proportion to the relatively small number of major injuries 
and the huge number of at risk behavior). Not every organization is the same, and the 
studies that were carried out by Heinrich, and in particular, in the late 60s by Frank Bird, 
Director of Insurance Services for a US engineering company, covered particular 
organizations at a particular point in time, but that doesn't reduce the importance of the 
study or its implications for the workplace today (Bird, 1996). Regardless of the fact that 
the ratio may change depending on industry and environment, the key finding - that the 
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really serious accidents are rare events, and while they shouldn't be ignored, 
concentrating on the opportunities to reduce minor accidents will reduce the chances of a 
major accident occurring - applies everywhere. By ensuring familiarity and compliance 
amongst the workforce with the safety standards that apply in the industry we're working 
in, we will reduce the number of at risk behavior, which will have a knock on impact on the 
number of minor injuries and from there to the number of major accidents that we will 
have to deal with. Starting from the base and moving towards the top, the number of what 
is indicated in each subdivision decreases, but we realize that, apart from the unsafe 
actions and conditions, all other events are results: once that occur can no longer be 
modified, so the only effective way to intervene is the elimination of what is located at the 
base of the triangle. It shows the relationship between unsafe work situations and 
accidents. This scheme is called reactive triangle and highlights the fact that the lower the 
rate of safe behavior and the higher the rate of accidents. In his domino theory, Heinrich 
argued that injuries resulted from accidents; accidents from unsafe acts which in turn 
occurred from the faults of people which had their origin in the social environment. Injuries 
could be best prevented by stopping accidents from happening. As the immediate cause 
of accidents was unsafe acts then eliminating them was the most effective focus of injury 
prevention programs. 
The phenomenon of complacency is a serious obstacle when trying to promote safety. If 
the probability of an accident is high confidence is not a problem: for example, it is quite 
rare to encounter difficulty in welders to wear protective equipment, in fact the probability 
of burning the eyes is so high as to make they use the protective eyewear with continuity. 
The safety triangle shows that before the accident itself many other actions and unsafe 
conditions occur. The frequency of these events reflects the probability at each level of the 
triangle: the probability of an injury is often simply too low to enable a consistent level of 
prudence in working practices. Every time a worker neglects a procedure without thereby 
experiencing a damage, you lose a little fear that motivates all to activate the safety 
procedures. The safety process centered on the behavior tends to combat this 
phenomenon. 
In order to promote safety and to fight excessive confidence in the high-risk activities, 
many companies are organized to directly involve workers and often adopt the same 
patterns used in their systems in order to achieve an increase in quality. The automatic 
consequence of these attempts is the formation of groups that operate for the 
improvement of safety trying to identify problems and to find suitable solutions. These 
groups give employees more control over safety activities in their workplace. The 
advantage of a team approach consists mainly in increasing the determination and 
support of the members for the project developed by them; moreover, the transfer of 
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responsibility for safety initiatives by management to employees moves the center of 
decision-making to the field work. In this way, finally, threat of punishment, that is often 
implicit in the safety programs dropped from above and that generate consequent 
negative effects on the working atmosphere, is reduced. 
However safety approaches based on working groups must usually deal with some 
common problems: one of these is the change of priority as soon as the situation is under 
control, and the result is a new series of accidents. This problem is common in groups 
formed by executives and employees. After having successfully reduced the accident rate 
attention turns elsewhere and the probability of accidents start to increase again. At this 
point the group must devote himself back to safety. Working groups also suffer from 
problems related to planning and organization. Often groups devote an excessive amount 
of time to the identification of safety problems and generate inadequate solutions or create 
new problems for other functions of the company. These problems are usually result of 
not well-defined processes and groups have no ongoing communication with 
management, no structured process to select problems and identify solutions, and no 
proper understanding of how to address issues related to performance. Depending on the 
type of industry, experience shows that a team approach to safety can reduce the 
accident rate between 5 and 10 accidents per 200.000 hours of work. Anyway, it’s 
essential to adopt a process of behavioral observation as will be described below in order 
to achieve high and stable levels of safety. Increasing safety behavior through a group-
based approach is the best way to ensure a consistent, high level of attention to 
occupational safety; it is also the best way to involve employees in the development and 
maintenance of safety procedures at work. 
Many contemporary safety improvement efforts suffer a further common set of problems. 
For example employees may suffer severe consequences for reporting accidents; severe 
penalties for experiencing accidents and significant incentives for not having accidents 
encourage employees not to honestly report minor accidents and injuries. Such incentive 
programs contribute to peer pressure that can encourage false reporting, thereby giving 
the appearance that the rate of recordable injuries is going down. Similarly, a steady rate 
of lost workdays is a red flag indicating that recordable accidents actually remain 
unchanged despite statistical improvements reported by the organization. 
Poorly designed awards programs and the threat of disciplinary action can jeopardize the 
integrity of systems designed to document such events. The risk of such simplistic 
approaches is increasing because of recent court decision. A few years ago, an employee 
in Texas won a workmen’s compensation case against an employer who had a safety 
“bingo program” that discouraged employees from accurately reporting injuries (Paragon 
Hotel Co. Vs. Ramirez, El Paso Court of Appeal, 783 Southwest 2nd 654, 1990). In 
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another case, a court ruled that a cash incentive that discouraged employees from 
reporting on-the-job injuries could provide evidence that an employee was terminated for 
filing a workmen’s compensation claim on an accident that he had not reported in 
accordance with company policy (Glass vs. Amber inc., Texas Court of Appeal, 01-00-
00589, 2001). Depending on other aspects of a company’s loss prevention efforts, an 
incentive that even inadvertently encourages employees to hide accidents can increase a 
company’s liability when an employee has an injury. 
A related problem with safety awards is that most do not reinforce safe behavior on the 
job. Many organizations base their awards on outcome measures such as safety statistics 
instead of on process measurements and behavior that promote safety. The problem with 
this approach is that too many employees simply roll the dice; they take shortcuts that 
allow them to complete jobs more quickly and comfortably. With today’s low incident rates, 
they will probably not have an injury. Meanwhile, they work with other employees who 
follow safety procedures day in and day out: employees who always wear a safety 
harness above 4 feet, employees who always get appropriate permits, and employees 
who always wear appropriate protective equipment. At the end of the year, however, 
these employees all get the same safety award. Such awards are little more than gifts to 
both safe employees and those who take risks. Such gifts may promote safety awareness, 
but they do very little to motivate employees to work safely on the job. 
A further problem with many safety programs is that they are management based. 
Management or staff make all plans and decisions regarding safety and the result is that 
employees rely on managers to ensure safety instead of watching out for one another. 
Employees are not challenged to achieve safety improvements and do not get a sense of 
accomplishment from such improvements in their work areas. In short, for many 
employees in these organizations, someone else has the primary responsibility. The 
process does not effectively create active, ongoing involvement for most employees. 
Another related problem is that many safety programs are primarily punishment based. 
Punishment-based programs are reactive in focusing on reducing unsafe acts rather than 
preventive in focusing on encouraging safe acts. An unsafe act cannot be corrected until it 
occurs, however, and each unsafe acts place employees at an increased risk of an injury. 
Safe acts, on the other hand, reduce the risks of an injury. Furthermore, a reliance on 
punishment creates additional problems that often are not readily apparent. 
Most of us have used punishment for a very simple reason: it works. But because it works 
quickly, its immediate payoff often causes some individuals, particularly those in positions 
of power, to become accustomed to its use. On the other hand, when we use positive 
feedback, the outcome is often less immediate and less clear. What happens when a 
supervisor provides positive feedback for following a safety procedure or when a parent 
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provides positive feedback to a child who is doing homework? The resulting behavior may 
be more positive on future occasions, but the outcome does not have the same immediate 
impact as punishment or corrective feedback. Furthermore, punishment should be either 
severe or highly probable, it is effective only in the presence of the punisher, often 
teaches to avoid being reprimanded rather than to implement desired behavior and 
damages interpersonal relationships, decreasing the active involvement and discouraging 
cooperation and the search for solutions. Finally, the punishment runs contrary to the 
philosophy of quality because, in an environment motivated by fear, the employees work 
because they have to and not because they want to (Krause et. al., 1999). Working under 
the pressure of intimidation, stress or disapproval rarely gives a sense of accomplishment 
or pride about the quality of work. If punishment is timely, legitimate and necessary we get 
corrective feedback and disciplinary measures in these situations become acceptable by 
most workers (Geller, 1997). It is therefore necessary that the demarcation line is clearly 
drawn and its crossing should result in disciplinary action. We must strive for a better 
balance, one that promotes better personal relationship and a more positive environment 
at work and at home. Doing so is especially important in achieving real and lasting safety 
in the workplace. It has been shown that when employees conduct safety observations 
using a safety checklist, their performance of safety practices on the checklist improves 
and becomes more consistent. Indeed departments with high level of observations have 
lower injury rates than departments that are not as successful at conducting observations 
and the injury rates of employees who participate in conducting observation are 50 
percent lower than those of employees who do not conduct observations. 
 
1.6. THE ABC MODEL 
BBS process is straightforward in theory but often is more difficult in practice. First we 
specify the desired behavior, then we analyze the situational and historical events that 
support a particular behavior. Behavior is simply anything someone does or says, it is an 
activity that a dead person cannot do, any muscular or glandular action or reaction (Malott 
et. al., 2000). It is not personality, attitude or intelligence. These are labels or abstraction 
that we often use to describe someone’s behavior in some specific way. Pinpointing is 
describing behavior in observable terms, without the use of labels or abstractions (Sulzer-
Azaroff, Austin, 2000). It means simply being specific in describing exactly what someone 
does without interpreting or evaluating the observed behavior. Pinpointing means avoiding 
the use of labels and objectively describing the actual behavior that might lead someone 
to use a label in normal conversation. The first step in designing a behavioral safety 
process is pinpointing a list of behaviors critical to safety without the use of labels or 
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explanations of behavior (Krause, 1997). Pinpointing is often a two-step process: pinpoint 
the problem, undesirable behavior (i.e. an unsafe act) or undesirable result of the behavior 
(an unsafe condition) and pinpoint the desired behavior, what we want employees to do 
(i.e. a safe act) or the desirable result of the behavior (a safe condition). 
The philosophy behind this approach is not about punishment/sanctions, but is based on a 
predictive standard, getting at the root cause; should avoid unsafe behavior and not with 
following interventions to the accident. As it is shown by the safety triangle fatalities or 
serious injuries are only the tip of the iceberg; any devices that tend to act on the top of 
the pyramid do not alter the base of the pyramid itself. The aim of this particular kind of 
approach consists precisely in modifying the levels below the accident, in order to reduce 
the occurrence probability. 
For a better understanding of this kind of approach it is necessary to introduce the issue of 
safety in a psychological/behavioral field to research those that are the dynamics of 
learning. BBS has Behavior Analysis as reference model, that is science that deals with 
the behavior by the study of learning processes and the basic laws for the individual 
acquisition of new skills and behavior; in particular, it turns attention to the paradigm of 
Burrhus Frederik Skinner, the father of the operant conditioning. Skinner, in Theory of the 
operant conditioning, defines ABC as “paradigm sufficient to explain all forms of learning 
and applicable to any type of behavior”. 
In 1938 the psychologist published The Behavior of Organism, which described the results 
of experiments conducted on the behavior of rats and pigeons. Based on these results, 
Skinner outlined the basic principles of operant conditioning, by defining a clear distinction 
from the classical conditioning. Skinner believed that classical conditioning could explain 
only part of the behavior: psychology must deal with the explanation of behavior by 
experimental science (Skinner, 1938). 
Skinner’s opinion was very precise and rigid enough to take the definition of radical 
behaviorism. His experiments were carried out through the introduction of guinea pigs in 
the so called Skinner Box, a cage which provided a dispensing instrument of food and 
water on the basis of a system of levers actuated by the animal. The box also included 
even more sophisticated tools such as colored lights, to add difficulty steps in the 
movements that the animal had to learn, and an electrified grid useful as negative 
reinforcement to learning of the guinea pig. Unlike Thorndike, for which the measurement 
of the number of errors and the speed of reaching the food served as units of evaluation 
of learning, in the case of Skinner positive feedback (i.e. correct ones) was taken into 
account (Thorndike, 1911). The greatest innovation given by Skinner theory is 
distinguished from simple Pavlovian conditioning for the importance to the role of 
conditioning factors intended as reinforcements (Pavlov, 1927). The positive 
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reinforcements are able to increase the frequency of a behavior, while the negative 
reinforcements are able to extinguish it. In this specific situation, it is the organism itself to 
procure reinforcement by acting on the environment and modifying it. Skinner then 
continued trying to specify what could be the appropriate reinforcements and timing to 
achieve greater results in terms of learning. Skinner’s work about behavior first gave a 
strong impetus to the study of animal behavior, especially on the effects of the 
contingencies of reinforcement, and then aims to human behavior. 
In 1957, after long studies, Skinner published Verbal Behavior, dedicated to the functional 
and non-formal analysis of verbal behavior. His theory involved the study of the total 
verbal episode, that is, not only what the speaker says, but the situation and the 
conditions in which he says, listener reactions (including non-verbal communication) and 
the role exchange that takes place between speaker and listener. We should consider the 
stimulus, the behavior itself and the reinforcement contingencies (given by both the verbal 
behavior of the interlocutor and by effects on the environment) (Daniels, 1989). 
According to the model developed by Skinner, behavior (B) are produced by antecedents 
(A), actions that cause the behavior (for example, a sign indicating the obligation to wear a 
safety helmet), but they are maintained or adjusted in accordance with consequence (C) 
stimuli. Consequence stimuli, called reinforcements, can be of two kinds: positive 
reinforcement (my team leader who notes that I wore the helmet properly and takes me as 
an example) and negative reinforcement or punishment (a rebuke for not putting the 
helmet). Skinner analysis show that only the first ones influence the maintenance of 
behavior provided as they are immediate, in other words received after a few seconds 
from the action, and definite, that is giving the assurance that actions have a significant 
effect (Skinner, 1957). 
Behavioral psychologists (especially in the safety field) frequently use the ABC model to 
explain at-risk (and safe) behavior (Geller, 2008, 1998). Basically, activators or 
antecedents get a person’s attention to behave in a certain way. This leads to 
consequences (which ultimately motivate behavior). Activators include such things as 
safety signs, meetings and rules. Behavior (safe or at-risk) are observable actions and 
include actions such as using a safety harness or locking out an energy source. Positive 
consequences include going home from work safely and personal pride (for safe work 
practices). Negative consequences include injuries and reprimands (for risky work 
practices). In addition, consequences can be strong or weak. Strong consequences are 
probable, soon and significant, while weak consequences are improbable, delayed and 
insignificant. 
Consider this quick analysis using the ABC model to help explain an at-risk behavior 
(grinding without a face shield). Activators that encourage an employee to use a protective 
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face shield include safety signs, training and supervisor presence. Activators that 
encourage an employee not to use a face shield include time pressure, damaged gear 
and a lack of availability. Consequences that encourage face shield use include not 
getting an eye injury and not getting in trouble. However, since it is improbable that an 
employee will be injured or get in trouble for grinding without a face shield (although these 
consequences would be soon and significant), these consequences lack strength. On the 
other hand, consequences that discourage face shield use include saving time, better 
vision and more comfort. These consequences are probable, soon and significant, which 
means they are strong (and, thus, the related behavior will likely be exhibited). In other 
words, the natural consequences are stronger for not wearing face shields than for 
wearing them. In many cases, the natural consequences for risky behavior outweigh the 
natural consequences for safe behavior. This is true for numerous behavior such as safety 
harness use, driving a forklift too fast or smoking cigarettes. This helps explain why 
employees may take safety shortcuts. 
 
Behavior principles include: 
 The Principle of Reinforcement: reinforcement occurs when a consequence 
follows an instance of behavior with the result that the behavior becomes more 
likely to occur. Consequences that result in the increased likelihood of the behavior 
are called reinforcers. 
 The Principle of Punishment: punishment occurs when a consequence follows an 
instance of behavior with the result that the behavior becomes less likely to occur. 
Consequences that result in the decreased likelihood of the behavior are called 
punishers. 
 The Principle of Extinction: extinction occurs when reinforcement for behavior 
ceases, with the result that the behavior becomes less likely to occur. Extinction 
also occurs when punishment for behavior ceases with the result that the behavior 
becomes more likely. 
To be effective consequences should be soon (occurs immediately after the 
behavior/performance), sure (employees know they will be recognized, and why they’re 
being recognized), significant (perceived as more than an entitlement; significance is 
defined by the receiver) and sincere (genuine appreciation or disapproval). 
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Figure 1.3 
 
1.7. TOTAL SAFETY CULTURE 
Achieving safety excellence requires going beyond the traditional safety focus of 
engineering and regulation. Because human behavior is a contributing cause to most 
accidents and injuries, safety excellence can only be achieved by addressing the human 
dimensions of safety. Reducing at-risk behavior and increasing safe behavior requires 
understanding how such behavior are motivated by system and cultural influences. 
Developing and sustaining a supportive safety culture hinges on understanding and 
applying the principles of behavioral science and person-based psychology to build tools 
and methods which encourage personal responsibility and interpersonal interaction about 
safety. We call this actively caring and it is an integral part of a Total Safety Culture.  
In a Total Safety Culture, employees not only feel responsible for their own safety, they 
feel responsible for their peers’ safety, and the organizational culture supports them acting 
on that responsibility. Individuals have the necessary tools and methods, as well as 
appropriate person states (e.g., self-esteem, group belonging, personal control) to actively 
care for the safety of co-workers. Additionally, the organization’s formal management 
systems and leaders’ informal management practices facilitate actively caring by 
encouraging, recognizing, and reinforcing appropriate behavior. 
Those companies implementing behavioral safety possess a high degree of organizational 
commitment to safety. However, the commitment of individual manager’s to the 
organization’s safety goals and the behavioral safety process is a significant factor 
(Eikenhout, Austin, 2005). Managers need to provide the necessary resources, give the 
workforce the authority to run and manage the process alongside the usual safety 
management systems, and actively support the process. In many instances this does not 
occur. 
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Safety leadership is critical to optimize safety culture and prevent injuries and fatalities. 
Effective safety leadership is typically viewed in terms of optimizing safety systems and 
conditions. Although this is key, safety leadership also involves managing skills for safety, 
including effective interpersonal communication. Strong safety leadership also requires 
effectively addressing employees’ behavior and attitudes for safety. 
Creating a Total Safety Culture requires a common vision and effort from everyone in an 
organization. There is compelling scientific research demonstrating that the management 
philosophy of an organization is the most important factor determining its safety 
performance. For example, research demonstrates that companies with the lowest lost-
time injury rates have the highest level of management commitment and employee 
involvement. In an organization that promotes safety culture, having workers examine 
their own safety and how safe they feel is the first step. Of course, it's key that 
management be on board, and that they truly care about employee safety. If employees 
don't feel comfortable, or even safe, reporting safety hazards, the risk of accidents and 
injury is likely to rise. So a management that promotes a safety culture does things like 
listening to workers' safety concerns and correcting unsafe conditions as they are 
reported, giving workers express permission to stop working if they believe they are in 
danger, encouraging workers to report problems and close calls and ensuring that the 
safety culture extends beyond full-time workers to contractors and anyone else who 
enters the workspace. 
Behavior-based safety proposes that workers' behavior is the key piece of the safety 
puzzle. In fact, achieving true workplace safety requires a broader scope and greater 
collaboration between management and on-the-ground workers. Do workers need to take 
responsibility for their behavior at work? Absolutely. But it's also up to employers to 
ensure that workers have the tools, resources and education to safeguard their own safety 
and help their employers improve overall safety in the workplace. 
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2. METHODS 
 
2.1. WHAT IS BBS 
The term Behavior Based Safety means an approach to safety management based on 
control of the worker behavior with the aim of drastically reducing accidents. This 
methodology, successfully tested in the 90's in the Anglo-Saxon world, had some 
significant applications in Italy. The family of methods and techniques known as BBS 
rapidly and finally became part of the set of essential tools for the reduction of 
occupational accidents. Adopted in growing exponentially also in Italy by large 
organizations, industry associations, associations for safety and universities, BBS owes its 
success to the unequivocal evidence of effectiveness, but also to the management system 
based on the involvement of non-punitive and the prominent role given to workers and 
safety experts as managers of the process. 
BBS is a set of methodologies and techniques that can identify specific unsafe behavior 
and their relative importance, explore in depth upstream and downstream behavior 
causes, lead to actions and interventions to remove these causes and motivate the 
implementation of safe behavior and provide injuries trend predictors. This is done in a 
context of solid involvement of workers, managers and all the business components that 
affect safety conditions in the company. 
It is crucial to move from a system of safety management which measures accidents and 
near miss to a system that has behavioral targets; it is similar to the transition from quality 
control of manufactured parts to quality assurance of the production process. This applies 
in general to the organization and therefore it requires a global cultural change. 
 
BBS is the result of three independent working tendencies. The first comes from the work 
of applied behavior analysis of psychologist Judi Komaki. Komaki was part of a small 
group of academics behavior analysts who worked on the performance in the industry. A 
Komaki’s student suggested that his family bakery would be an ideal application for an 
academic project; the student said that bakery leaders were concerned about safety. 
With Dr. Komaki’s advices the company adopted a behavior based model to improve 
safety performance that produced satisfactory results (Komaki, Barwick & Scott, 1978). 
Although the time during which the results were measured was short, it was evident the 
potential of the methodology adopted. 
In 1979 Thomas R. Krause and associated psychiatrist John Hidley were asked to consult 
with a California offshore oil drilling equipment manufacturer in order to look for innovative 
ways to improve safety performance. Studying the preliminary analysis of the situation 
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faced by this employer, Krause recommended the use of applied behavior analysis as an 
improvement methodology (Krause, 1979). In the same period Gene Earnest and Jim 
Palmer at Procter & Gamble were developing a methodology from the science of behavior 
which they called Behavior Based Safety. Note that Earnest and Palmer were the first to 
adopt this terminology, then remained unchanged until today (Earnest & Palmer, 1979). At 
the same time, a number of researchers in behavioral science and safety experts were 
carrying out a research of this type. Dan Petersen collected and described the approach 
used during the trial, based on what had been published on the BBS until that moment 
(Petersen, 1989) and Frank Bird used some behavioral models to teach industrial 
organizations to reinforce safe behavior (Bird, 1996). Scott Geller took part in research on 
the use of seat belts and published numerous articles on how to increase their use 
through the intervention on behavior in order to make the use of the belt as an instinctive 
and not annoying action (Geller, 1984). Later, after becoming a field of success, other 
consultants interested in the performance management began to direct their efforts 
towards safety. All those who worked in this field in the early years used a top-down 
approach, guided by supervisors. In this model supervisors were trained on how to apply 
methods of behavioral analysis to safety to reach improvement goals. This BBS model, 
embryonic and poorly coordinated, started to change radically in 1986 when a growing 
number of companies began to adopt the methods of Total Quality Management (TQM), 
influencing the BBS system with the principles of Total Quality, also based on human 
involvement in order to improve the production chain. 
Since 1997 there has been a huge development in the application and diffusion of 
behavior based methods and, on the wave of the success, there has been a development 
of professional consultants. This is a half luck because while it is positive that more and 
more companies are benefiting from this important and proven methodology, on the other 
hand has become as a fad, or simply "the thing to do" to improve image on the market. 
This is a real disadvantage, because it means that these companies sometimes pursue 
BBS for the wrong reasons. The factor of "me too!" also concerns professionals, many of 
whom say they experienced while having very little understanding of the methodology. 
Other professionals instead, while having too little understood what really are the behavior 
based methods, place themselves in the opposite situation, pronouncing uninformed 
judgments about it. 
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2.2. CURRENT CONFUSION ABOUT BBS 
The ambiguity about BBS is so widespread that the term has lost its power to describe 
anything clearly. Even a casual search of recent literature reveals contradictory uses of 
the term. For example, some organizations call their programs BBS, yet involve no 
shopfloor personnel in the effort, and have no operational definitions of critical behavior 
and no continuous improvement mechanism. What they actually have is a traditional 
supervisor audit program focused on disciplinary action. Proponents of this approach 
often refer to it as BBS, even though the only BBS element present is the label. This 
reflects the current trend in which various techniques, including the use of incident-
contingent incentives, are labeled BBS (in an apparent effort to make them popular). At 
one end of the continuum of confusion is the idea that anything involving behavior, 
attitude, culture, workers, etc., is BBS. The next level of confusion is represented by the 
idea that to implement BBS, one must simply identify behavior on a checklist, have 
employees observe others, apply reinforcement (including tangible incentives) and then sit 
back and watch incident rates fall. 
This drastic oversimplification is troublesome even when the effort is supplemented by 
standards safety activities. This confusion is unfortunate for the safety sector because an 
integrated methodology for improving performance based on behavior is one of the few 
safety improvement methods to have solid, scientifically based data to support its 
effectiveness. Krause, Seymour and Sloat provided one of the most rigorous and 
comprehensive integrated methodology assessment of behavior based performance 
improvement, integrating TQM principles with those of applied behavior analysis (Krause, 
Seymour and Sloat, 1999). 
The popularity of the method merely adds to the confusion. Firms implement BBS 
initiatives simply because it is “the thing to do” rather than because they understand its 
implications and are willing to commit the resources to do it correctly. This leads to poor-
quality initiatives that typically fail and lead to the conclusion “We tried BBS but it didn’t 
work" (Krause, 1997). It is worth noting that the same confusion arose about TQM. 
Actually all methods of performance improvement over the past thirty years have 
undergone this same process. Organizations tend to burn up useful methodologies by 
jumping into them without committing adequate resources. In the wake of such 
enthusiasm, organizations confuse and distort the method. Then, the tool breaks and all 
involved wonder why. 
An organization that seeks to improve safety via BBS must first understand what the 
methodology entails, determine whether external expertise is needed and, if so, which 
approach to use. The real differences between the various choices are pretty clear and 
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the facts are relatively simple to discern. A company that has received good information 
could probably decide what is best for itself within a few weeks, but because of the 
confusion that was created is not unusual today for a company to spend one or two years 
to sift through and to orientate within this confusion. This can benefit from a serious effort 
to address what is the model of BBS which produced results, effectively and in a 
consistent manner over time. 
From 1980 to 1985 the method used by Krause and his associates was management-
driven, from the top down. Supervisors were trained in the method, then applied it to the 
operative personnel, there was minimal use of data, behavioral inventories were large, 
sometimes up to 100 behaviors. The focus was primarily on individual behavior and how 
to change it through application of reinforcements. 
From 1986 to 1996 this model evolved into one that was employee-driven. This change 
was strongly influenced by the TQM movement, which was prevalent in the petrochemical 
industry at that time. Many clients wanted to involve workers in significant ways. 
Consequently, TQM and organization development principles were integrated with those 
of applied behavior analysis. In addition, software was developed to capture data 
generated during behavioral observation; emphasis was placed on feedback as an 
improvement mechanism and as a type of reinforcement. Since 1997 the model has 
evolved to include more completely the engagement of all employees. 
The benefit of the first approach lies in its ease of implementation and the lower level of 
required training. Changing to an employee-driven model has given the enormous 
advantage of the involvement of the staff; this is so important that it is difficult to quantify 
the merits because in fact creates a new culture that offers enormous benefits. However, 
despite warnings against, many companies left out managers and supervisors. It was as if 
people thought that in order to involve the front-line staff was necessary to exclude 
supervisors and managers. 
As a result, change efforts had strong frontline employee involvement and support, but 
weak managerial support and involvement. These firms quickly learned that to achieve 
long-term success, all managers and supervisors must be involved in the process. This 
led to the present model in which all staff is involved, and it combines the applied behavior 
analysis with the techniques of quality management and organizational development to 
create a comprehensive safety development methodology. This does not mean, however, 
that BBS should be seen as the entire safety system, but rather as one of its many 
components. 
Since its inception and application in the mid-1970s, behavioral safety has undergone a 
series of evolutionary changes. The first approach, popular in the early 1970s to mid-
1980s, was largely a supervisory, top-down-driven process. Based on operant theory 
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(Skinner, 1953), supervisors observed worker behavior, gave feedback and provided 
some form of positive or negative reinforcement. Behavior change did not last once 
reinforcers were removed. Simple and cheap to implement, this approach attracted 
legitimate criticism (Howe, 1998) that has since been hard to dispel. Perhaps as a 
reaction to those criticisms, employee-led processes emerged during the early-1980s. In 
these interventions, which are still common, employees develop the overall process, 
conduct peer-to-peer or workgroup-based observations and provide feedback. However, 
the downside was (and is) the exclusion of management, leading to the common 
perception that behavioral safety processes focus solely on employee behavior (Hopkins, 
2006). This led, in the 1990s, to the cultural approach based on the concept of a 
managerial and employee partnership. Employees monitor the behavior of all members of 
a workgroup or work area, and managers regularly monitor their own safety-related 
leadership behavior (e.g., whether they reviewed and closed out corrective actions). 
Everyone involved receives regular feedback, with some also receiving tangible 
reinforcers or incentives (Chandler & Huntebrinker, 2003). Surveys of behavioral safety 
users show that all three approaches are widely used around the world (Cooper, 2008). 
 
2.3. VALUE-BASED BEHAVIOR SAFETY PROCESS 
The following chart provides an overview of the stages in the implementation process: 
 
1. SAFETY ASSESSMENT
2. EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW AND 
DESIGN TEAM WORKSHOP
3. FINAL DESIGN
4. IMPLEMENT BEHAVIORAL
SAFETY PROCESS
5. MAINTAIN BEHAVIORAL
SAFETY PROCESS
Establish Mission, Values
and Milestone Targets
Create Safety
Observation Process
Design Feedback & Involvement 
Procedures
Develop Recognition &
Celebration Plans
Plan Training and Kickoff Mettings
Conduct Management Review
 
Figure 2.1 
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The key to the successful behavioral safety process is getting the right teams together to 
plan the implementation: 
 Management team: this group regularly checks the activity and directs both during 
the design phase and during the implementation process; 
 Design Team: This group is mainly responsible of the assessment and initial 
planning process; 
 Steering Committee: This group is responsible for all matters relating to the 
implementation of the process. 
The introduction of a BBS system must not necessarily call for the establishment of all 
three types of group mentioned above, but they will be formed according to its extension 
and scope. Anyway the Design team will be always present in every implementation of the 
BBS system. 
 
2.4. SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
A safety assessment is a formal study of the organization’s current level of safety 
performance and the practices that impact safety. It is not the same as a safety audit. A 
safety assessment examines the process the organization uses to manage safety. A 
typical safety audit, on the other hand, examines the extent to which employees are in or 
out of compliance with established safety procedures and environmental conditions are in 
or out of compliance with established requirements. Conducting the assessment serves 
two purposes: an accurate and complete understanding of the organization’s current 
safety efforts will result in better recommendations and the interviews, presentations and 
discussions resulting from the assessment will help to build support for initiating 
improvement efforts.  
The assessment can be either a team or an individual effort. Using a team requires 
greater coordination but will usually result in a better implementation plan and broader 
support for that plan. We should also consider use of outside consultants to either conduct 
the assessment or guide assessment our assessment efforts. This phase has several 
objectives: 
 Identify existing efforts and develop a plan that builds on these efforts; 
 Incorporate input from key personnel; 
 Identify high-risk areas and activities; 
 Identify training needs; 
 Identify potential design team members; 
 Build management support for implementation. 
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Before developing our recommendations, we should identify the key elements of our 
organization’s current safety efforts, what was done in the past and related improvement 
efforts. This history will enable to develop and position the plant to build on existing and 
past efforts instead of creating an impression of a “new program of the month”. 
As part of the assessment process, we should talk with people in each area of the 
organization. Such interchanges will provide them with an opportunity to have input into 
the plans. As mentioned, these discussions also begin to model the involvement that will 
continue later in the implementation phase. 
Another objective is to identify the high-risk areas and activities within the organization. It 
is possible via both interviews and a review of the organization’s incident records. Then 
we compare this information with incident statistics to identify which work areas have the 
greatest risk and which jobs and tasks within those areas are highest risk. We can use 
this information to identify work areas that will be high priority and jobs and tasks that will 
receive special attention. It may also suggest the areas where we will want to pilot the 
behavioral safety process and identify practices we will want to be sure to include in 
observation checklist. 
During assessment observations, we may also identify skill deficits that are likely to have 
an impact on the success of safety efforts. In the initial stages, the focus of assessment 
will be on management and supervisory personnel rather than the employees. Later we 
will have to plan to address the deficiencies in these areas through training and coaching. 
The best way to identify design team member is to take nominations from employees. 
Generally, the design team will be made up of 8-12 representative employees, a safety 
professional, one person from the engineering department and a representative from 
management. 
Ideal candidates are employees who have demonstrated and interest in safety, are well 
respected by their co-workers and are assertive about asking questions and stating their 
opinions. The employees in each area who have the most nominations should be invited 
to participate on the design team. 
Finally, the most important objective of the assessment is to create management 
understanding and support for the implementation plan. Once we have completed 
assessment, we should prepare a final report and schedule a presentation to 
management. This report should summarize findings and recommend a plan a plan for 
enhancing organization’s safety efforts. The assessment report and presentation will 
provide us with an opportunity to ensure that management understands what we are 
attempting to do and it is willing to support the recommended improvements. 
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The primary outcome of the assessment may be a presentation or a formal report typically 
including a summary of observations and findings, the recommended team 
implementation process, suggested design team participants, preliminary plans for each 
stage of the project and a detailed schedule and cost estimate. The final report is primarily 
a matter of describing those safety efforts and making recommendations on how to 
implement changes that will move organization toward closer alignment with the 
standards suggested by the current research. 
The assessment involves more than simply gathering data. It also involves analyzing the 
information on current safety efforts, developing recommendations on potential 
improvement, and building support for those improvements. 
The first step is to review organization’s safety data, both the statistics and the actual 
incident reports. Getting this information is part of an analysis of documents of the last two 
or three years on the rate of accidents (number of accidents, severity, frequency and 
incidence) and jobs, activities or operative groups more vulnerable to accidents, trying to 
identify the environmental, social and occupational contingencies. It is also useful to 
analyze the timing of the accident during the work shift, as well as in the month, the week 
and the day. 
If the rate of incidents is higher than the industry average we should have no trouble 
building support for improvements efforts. Management will usually support a well-
developed plan to move to a leadership position in safety within its industry. If the rate of 
injuries is greater than the norm for the industry, safety improvements will produce 
significant dollar savings in insurance, workmen’s compensation and liability costs. The 
safety data should also help you identify groups with the highest and lowest incidence 
rates, so it is necessary to conduct the bulk of interviews and observation with these 
groups to learn what factors account for their current levels of safety performance. 
After an initial analysis of safety data we have the conduct of interviews with focused 
questions on how to manage safety. To support these interviews it can be useful to use a 
written surveys that allows to receive a variety of information from a large number of 
workers by optimizing the time spent on interviews. We should try to visit several safety 
meeting and observe several typical safety audits in different areas, in order to gather 
information about these activities. 
Once the data gathering is completed, we have to analyze information and develop an 
implementation plan, by comparing organization’s current safety management practices 
with those proven to be effective in the latest research studies. 
Then we must develop a plan for implementing changes to safety process that move 
organization toward the model suggested by current research. If we work in a large 
organization or at a large site, we have to consider whether to pilot behavioral process. A 
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pilot is a good idea if the organization in likely to be particularly resistant to the idea. Most 
employees should view the pilot areas as representative of the organization and it should 
usually have a high rate of incidents and management personnel willing to support the 
behavioral safety process. We will also need to recommend whether observations should 
be conducted by managers and supervisors or employees or both. 
Once we have a preliminary idea of who should be responsible for the observations, we 
will have a better idea of who to involve in the design teams: as a rule, we need to involve 
the people who will initially do the observations. 
In the final report we must stress the realistic benefits that will result from a systematic 
implementation of the behavioral safety process, as employees who better understand 
safety procedures, greater compliance with safety procedures, exemplary injury rates and 
sustainable process. 
During the presentation we explain the kind of support and involvement required from 
management, to get a “go-ahead” decision and to make this effort successful. 
 
2.5. MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW AND DESIGN TEAM WORKSHOPS 
To ensure success, we should initiate the process in a carefully planned and well-
organized manner that ensures a high level of understanding of the changes we propose. 
We have at least three groups to consider: managers and supervisors, those who will be 
participating in the design team, and other employees. By providing a behavioral safety 
workshop, we will give design team members an understanding of their tasks and the 
basic set of the skills they will need for planning activities. We will also establish a group 
of knowledgeable employees in the work area who can provide information to others 
about the behavioral safety process. 
A management overview is an orientation for management and supervisory personnel that 
introduces the enhancements we plan to make to the organization’s safety improvement 
efforts. 
The goal is to ensure that managers and supervisors in the area know about the proposed 
changes. This understanding will remove fear of the unknown and help build their support 
for the new process. Depending on the size of the organization, we may want to provide a 
series of kickoff meetings for all employees, instead of just managers. These may be short 
overviews presented as part of regular safety meetings or a separate series of meeting. 
These meetings have several objectives: to provide an overview of the elements of the 
behavioral safety process and why it is being implemented, to ensure that line 
management knows how to support the implementation process at this stage and to let 
people know how to influence the process. 
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The initial workshop is similar to the management overview except that it usually includes 
formal training for those who will participate in the design team. This workshop has 
several objectives: to provide the necessary skills to those who will participate in the 
design process, to build better understanding and support from key managers and 
employees and to get initial input from participants as a basis for later development. 
 
2.6. FINAL DESIGN 
Here we will be working with the design team to carry out the next phase of the 
recommendations: the development of a detailed implementation plan for the new safety 
process within the organization. The recommendations from the assessment along with 
initial ideas captured during the design team workshop will serve as a preliminary design 
and provide a starting point for the design team’s efforts. This way we will not walk into a 
design team meeting and begin to brainstorm what the team members think needs to be 
done. Rather, we start by presenting the assessment recommendations and the rationale 
for those recommendations along with the team’s input from the design team workshop. 
After this presentation, we change hats and become a participant in the meeting. As a 
participant, we will work with the other team members to finalize the implementation plans, 
we have input into the team’s decision, but we cannot force our views, just trust the team 
process. The important thing is to create an adaptive system that responds to experience 
in ways that will help employees prevent future incidents and injuries. In this phase the 
goal is to work with the design team to complete detailed plans for enhancing 
organization’s process for managing safety in the work areas. 
Generally, design and implementation efforts will follow a six-process. If the design team 
is conducting periodic planning, some of these steps may occur almost at the same time 
or in a different order. 
 
2.6.1. Establishing Mission, Values and Milestone targets 
Before starting to finalize the design of the safety process, we have to work with the 
design team to develop a goal or purpose statement. We may choose to develop the 
mission or purpose statement as a group exercise during the meeting and to prepare a 
sample schedule based on best guess about the activities and the amount of time 
required for each. Then, in the first meeting, we allow the team to discuss, modify and 
approve both the purpose statement and the schedule for presentation to the 
management team. 
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In a structured process we brainstorm actions likely to impact the process, then sort these 
practices into value categories, use values in designing safety process and use values as 
criteria for evaluation. The ideal number is between three and seven practices for each 
value. In short, the values can serve as guidelines for the kinds of behavior expected 
within the organization and thereby clarify behavior that members of the organization will 
support. 
The team will also need to develop milestone schedule for completing each stage of 
planning and implementation, especially if it is conducting periodic planning meetings. 
These design reviews not only allow an opportunity for management to have input into 
plans but also ensure that management is informed and willing to support those plans. 
Regardless of the approach, we will need to coordinate the schedule with management to 
ensure that they are available to participate in the design review. 
 
2.6.2. Creating observation process 
The foundation for maximizing the effectiveness of the safety process is the regular 
observation of safe practices. An effective observation process offers the following 
advantages: improves the safety practices of observers, results in better hazard 
recognition, provides feedback on the effectiveness of the safety process, establishes a 
baseline for setting improvements targets, provides practice in observing and discussing 
safety and adds social consequences for safe work practices and provides a basis for 
additional forms of employee recognition. By conducting safety observations, employees 
are learning to identify hazards in their work areas, which may, at least in part, explain 
why they begin to work more safely. 
The observation process also provides a measure of the success of the safety 
management process. By collecting data on safe practices we have an in-process 
measure of safety. This use if observation data is in contrast with the traditional use of 
incidence rate data, which is an outcome measure of safety. An observation process 
provides an opportunity to work proactively with employees on their work practices before 
someone gets hurt. It also enables to evaluate the effectiveness of specific safety 
improvement efforts. In addition, an observation process can identify possible problem 
areas regarding work activities. One of the key features of such efforts is a focus on the 
process rather than simply on outcomes. This also provides a source for data for 
employees to use in identifying practices that need improvement. The data enable 
employees to set improvement goals based on what they had been doing and what they 
thought they could do better. One reason for establishing a behavioral safety process is to 
help employees within the organization get into the habit of talking to one another about 
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safety. Our ideal organization establishes a culture where each employee is his brother’s 
(or her sister’s) keeper. Operationally, this practice might mean that everyone is paying 
attention to how co-workers are doing their jobs and regularly talking with them about the 
safety of their work practices. 
The observation process is structured through the following steps: 
 Analyze past incidents and injuries: typically we will want to review every incident 
that has occurred within the last three to five years, then determine the practices 
that would have prevented the injuries from occurring. We identify critical 
behaviors for observation checklist based on both the frequency of their 
occurrence and their potential severity and we identify whether severe injuries 
most likely occur during routine or non-routine operations. We should sort the 
incidents by department and also separate the lost-time injuries from medical 
treatment cases. We may also do an analysis of when employees are most likely 
to experience an injury, in terms of both the time of day and the day of the week. 
 Develop a list of critical safe practices: the next step is to prepare a list of safety 
practices that will be needed to create checklists using the information gathered in 
the previous step to sort the categories and behavior in the order of their 
contribution to injuries. We have to organize the remaining categories in order of 
their contribution to injuries, with the category that contributes most at the top of 
the list. In other words, place the worksheet category that makes the largest 
contribution to injuries (usually “body position and ergonomics”) at the top of the 
list. Then we have to sort the behaviors within each category to reflect this same 
order of contribution to past injuries so that we have the behaviors that have 
historically contributed to the most injuries at the top of each category and those 
that gave contributed the least at the bottom of each category. The next step is to 
compare the lists developed for each department to determine whether they share 
a common set of critical practices or each department is unique enough to warrant 
a separate checklist. Often, the ideal will be to have a checklist that is roughly 75 
percent generic, with a separate section that is specific to each department. On 
our checklist we want to include safe practices, not unsafe practices. The rationale 
is twofold. First, we must be very clear about desired safety practices in order to 
facilitate communication to everyone in the area. Second, we want to increase the 
attention being paid to safe behavior and what employees are doing right. 
 Draft and revise checklist: Once we have developed the list of pinpointed safety 
practices we begin the process of designing the actual checklists. The first step is 
probably to shorten the list of pinpointed items and also consider eliminating not 
relevant pinpointed checklist items. Usually we record the name of the employee 
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conducting the observation, the employee’s department, where the observation is 
being conducted, date and time, a brief set of instructions for completing the form 
and a space, typically at the bottom of the checklist, for additional comments. 
Usually the observation checklist is kept to no more than one side of one sheet of 
paper: the first side shows the observations of the specific safety activities, on the 
back we have a definitions for easy reference. 
 Develop the observation procedure: design team should develop formal guidelines 
for conducting observation, considering some question as who will conduct the 
observations, observers and observed voluntariness, observation annunciation, 
frequency, etc. Currently almost all organizations plan to involve employees in 
conducting observations. Still, for some organizations, getting managers and 
supervisors involved in conducting safety observations, at least as an initial step, is 
often an appropriate start. For most organizations that implement BBS, 
participation as an observer is voluntary for employees, but this is a decision that 
should be made by design team. If the process is voluntary, the organization has a 
way of measuring complacency. We also need to consider whether observers 
should announce when observations are going to be conducted. For most 
organizations, announcing safety observations is an important practice in support 
of the values of openness and respect for employees. An observer can easily 
announce the observation when he or she enters the work area, often by simply 
making eye contact with the co-worker to be observed, then holding up a clipboard 
and pointing at it prior to starting the observation. You may want to consider 
announcing observations initially: the disadvantage of this approach is that 
observers may not observe a work sample typical of normal practices. Social 
psychology studies have revealed that people act differently when they know they 
are under observation. This is not really as large a problem as it may seem. If 
employees work more safely during observations, observers have the opportunity 
to reinforce safety practices that are more likely to be performed in the future. The 
frequency of observations is important. The risk associated with business should 
determine whether observations are made daily, weekly, or monthly; in a high-risk 
business with many employees, we should probably conduct daily observations. 
 Feedback on observations: as a general rule, we should plan a process in which 
observers routinely provide immediate feedback as part of their observations. The 
discussion of the observation should be a dialogue between the observer and the 
employee observed. This feedback procedure should be an important element of 
the training provided to all observers. The observer should summarize the 
significant safety practices that were observed, then communicate the one or two 
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practices that caused the greatest concern. Generally, the observer begins by 
listing one or two of the things that the employee was doing right: “Here are some 
ways that you are minimizing your risk of injury…(lists the relevant safe practices).” 
Or the observer might use a variation such as “Some practices that I thought 
contributed to your safety are…” Our observer next goes on to summarize the 
unsafe practices: “Here are some things I am concerned about…(lists relevant 
unsafe practices).” Or again a variation such as “These are few practices that are 
placing people at risk…(lists unsafe practices).” Or “How would it work 
if…(followed by a request for the safe practice).” When employees have such a 
reason for their action, the observer should record it on the observation form as it 
will be important in helping the steering committee in developing action plans to 
address that concern. While getting such information is important, observers 
should be taught not to interrogate the employees that they observe. The 
discussion should be a two-way, problem-solving discussion that is educational for 
both parties. In particular, observers should avoid two kinds of problems caused by 
(1) asking rhetorical questions and (2) asking questions that start with “why”. 
Asking “Why…(is an employee doing something)?” has a negative impact in that it 
tends to make the employee defensive rather than set the occasion for a 
constructive problem-solving discussion. The same information can always be 
gathered by asking questions that start with “what” or “how”, which does not seem 
to create the same defensiveness.  
 Trial run the observation checklist and process: at this point the design team is 
ready to do a trial run of the observation process. Developing a good checklist is 
an empirical process and we always learn more about them as our experience 
increases. The best strategy is to experiment for several weeks, then design the 
best observation checklist and use it for three to six months. Remember that the 
checklist is a dynamic tool. It should change to meet the changing needs of your 
work environment, yet should remain stable for periods long enough to document 
goal achievement, generally from six months to a year.  
Once we have completed the trial run and made final revisions to both checklist and 
procedure, the design team should present the observation process to management. 
 
2.6.3. Designing feedback and involvement procedures 
Creating an effective feedback and involvement process includes developing guidelines 
for using graphs, planning reviews of safety process data, developing guidelines for 
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setting improvement goals and establishing guidelines to expand involvement in 
observations. 
Numerous studies have shown that posting performance graphs has a significant positive 
impact on employee performance, and most research studies investigating behavioral 
safety programs have included graphs of the observation data. Graphing safety 
observation data is a good way to communicate the data to employees. In addition, 
graphs help employees identify trends and set improvement targets. In planning to use 
graphs, we must emphasize safety on the job, not numbers on graph. The risk in using 
graphs is placing too much emphasis on the numbers. The result is that we influence 
reporting, not performance. 
To get the maximum benefit from the observation process organization should build a 
review of the data into existing meetings and weekly safety meetings. Once we have the 
observation process up and running, we will usually want to expand employee 
involvement. Expanded participation might begin through join observations, the new 
observers participating alongside of supervisors or experienced observers. 
Reinforcement and feedback is an important issue related to the application of BBS. 
Some experts emphasize reinforcement as the BBS primary mechanism of improvement. 
If the only used technology is the Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), reinforcement is 
necessarily seen as the main method of improvement, while it should be integrated with 
other methods, although the feedback represents the most effective available 
reinforcement. The advantage of using feedback as reinforcement, compared to tangible 
rewards (prizes, vouchers, etc.) is that it tends to significantly involve workers, sending the 
right message and building a positive culture. 
 
The feedback which follows the observation provides positive social support for doing a 
task safely even when at-risk alternatives are easier, faster, and more convenient. 
Information about at-risk behavior is given to avoid potential injury. The data from the 
observation cards are collected and compiled. Work teams then develop relevant 
intervention strategies to reduce the likelihood of the targeted at-risk behavior using a 
continuous improvement process known as DO IT (Geller, 2001). 
The DO IT process involves four sequential steps: 
a) Define relevant target behavior to increase or decrease in frequency 
b) Observe target behavior during a baseline phase and set specific goals for 
achievement 
c) Intervene to improve the target behavior 
d) Test the impact of the intervention by continuing to observe the target behavior. 
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If the desired results are not achieved, other interventions are implemented. When 
improvement goals are met, other target behavior are selected for improvement. 
 
Figure 2.2 
Let’s see the DO IT process in details. The project team defines behavior that need 
improvement from a baseline of observation data. The team works with employees to 
develop interventions to improve the defined behavior, then tests whether the 
interventions worked. If so, the team defines other behavior to address. If not, the group 
brainstorms new intervention ideas to try. For example, an oil company noted low levels of 
glove use among employees. Three months of observations revealed that employees 
wore their gloves only 25% of the time (D = glove use, O = observe for 3 months to find 
percentage of use). Rather than mandate glove use at all times, the steering team elected 
to talk with employees to learn how to get them to wear gloves more often. The team 
brainstormed and implemented the following interventions (I): provide better fitting gloves, 
make the gloves more accessible, provide hand injury testimonials at tailgate meetings, 
set a goal of 85% glove use for 6 months and convince the safety director to shave his 
head if the goal is met. 
The last criterion was most strongly embraced by employees (and begrudgingly accepted 
by the safety director). Within the first month, percent safe scores climbed from 25% to 
nearly 100% - results that were maintained for six months. To celebrate, the company 
closed the site for an afternoon, served food and drinks, and recruited an hourly employee 
to shave the safety director’s head. Morale was reported to be high. The steering team 
continued to test (T) glove use for several months following the celebration. Although 
glove use dropped to around 75%, this level was considered an improvement compared 
to the baseline data of 25%. In addition, the company indicated that the number of 
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reported hand cuts/lacerations decreased approximately 85% during this time. These 
improvements were attributed to the combination of the noted interventions. 
Using the checklist, employees periodically observe each other using simple but effective 
observation techniques. Following each observation, the observer gives appropriate one-
on-one coaching feedback regarding the safe and at-risk behavior observed. This one-on-
one dialogue occurring between peers is instrumental in changing at-risk work practices. 
In some cases, the feedback provides information to the individual about risky behavior 
they may have been performing unintentionally, thereby allowing the worker to change his 
or her behavior in the future. In other cases, the feedback provides social support to 
encourage peers to take the time to perform behavior in the safest manner when an 
alternative at-risk behavior is easier, faster, and/or more convenient. And finally, the 
feedback allows the observer and observed to analyze the situation together to identify 
and remove any barriers to safe work performance such as uncomfortable or inconvenient 
PPE or ergonomically incorrect equipment layout. 
 
Following some guidelines for providing effective, corrective feedback to coworkers when 
they are working at-risk we shouldn’t make it personal, but focus on behavior, should ask 
questions to facilitate discussion and don’t lecture, give feedback immediately and one-
on-one, show genuine concern for the other person’s well-being, work together to find 
better solutions and finally thank the person for listening. When receiving corrective 
feedback some points to consider are: actively listen and don’t interrupt, remain open and 
receptive, don’t get defensive, discuss better ways of doing the task and thank the person 
for providing feedback. 
In addition to cautioning co-workers operating at-risk, it’s important to praise employees 
who regularly do their jobs safely. This builds an open, positive safety culture and 
increases the likelihood work practices will be performed safely in the future. Employees 
at all organizational levels benefit from providing frequent, genuine praise for safe work 
practices. 
A complicating factor with safety communication is that people have different styles of 
communicating. According to Marty Brounstein, who wrote Communicating Effectively for 
Dummies, there are four basic communication styles: Dominant, Passive, Passive-
Aggressive and Empathic. The first three styles are generally maladaptive and stifle the 
development of a Total Safety Culture. The fourth style, the empathic communicator, is 
ideal and most conducive to effective communication and the improvement of an 
organization’s culture. 
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2.6.3.1. The Dominant Communicator 
Dominant communicators tend to run people over in conversations. They tend to believe 
they’re never wrong, their opinions are more important than those of others’ and people 
who disagree with them are either disloyal or misinformed. 
These characteristics often lead to the following maladaptive behavior: 
• Publicly criticize others 
• Blame others when problems arise 
• Act bossy and negative 
• Use verbally aggressive and threatening language 
• Lack appreciation for the accomplishments of others 
• Interrupt others, often finishing their sentences 
• Dismiss new ideas without listening to the rationale 
 
Dominant communicators have the following effects on others: 
• Provoke fear, countercontrol and alienation 
• Foster resistance, defiance, sabotaging, striking back, alliance formation, lying and 
covering-up behavior 
• Damage corporate culture and morale 
• Hinder optimal organizational performance 
 
2.6.3.2. The Passive Communicator 
Passive communicators tend to turn people off by being indirect and meek in their 
interpersonal communication. They tend to believe you shouldn’t express your true 
feelings, make waves or disagree. They often think other people’s opinions are more 
important than their own. 
These characteristics often lead to the following maladaptive behavior: 
• Remain quiet, even when being treated unfairly 
• Ask for permission unnecessarily 
• Frequently complain rather than act 
• Delegate personal choice to others 
• Retreat from interpersonal conflict 
• Agree rather than question direction 
• Accept directions without questions 
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Passive communicators have the following effects on others: 
• Frustration and mistrust because of not knowing where they stand 
• Presume they lack the courage to be a leader 
• Open communication is hindered 
 
2.6.3.3. The Passive-Aggressive Communicator 
Passive-Aggressive communicators tend to believe you should go behind people’s backs 
instead of dealing with people directly. 
These unhealthy beliefs often lead to these undesirable behavior: 
• Appearing to agree with others when they really don’t 
• Making sarcastic remarks and taking subtle digs at others 
• Sending critical messages via email and copying others 
• Holding grudges and valuing “getting even” 
• Sabotaging people behind their backs (e.g., spreading negative gossip) 
• Refusing to help others 
• Giving others “the silent treatment” 
 
Passive-Aggressive communicators have the following effects on others: 
• Increased factions and favoritism 
• Increased negative gossip or “back stabbing” 
• Low interpersonal trust 
• Diminished job performance 
• Increased uncertainty and job dissatisfaction 
• Increased turnover 
 
2.6.3.4. The Empathic Communicator 
Unlike the previous three styles, the Empathic communicator interacts effectively with 
others to maintain healthy long-term relationships. Companies with numerous empathic 
communicators are likely to have more healthy organizational cultures. 
Empathic communicators generally believe: 
• Personal opinions and the opinions of others are important 
• The process of arriving at a decision (not just the outcome) is important 
• Getting input from others boosts morale and generally leads to better decision making 
 
These beliefs often lead to these desirable behavior: 
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• Communicating expectations instead of demands 
• Focusing on proactive and action-oriented conversation 
• Stating realistic expectations 
• Communicating in a direct and honest manner 
• Working to achieve goals without compromising others 
 
Empathic communicators have the following effects on others: 
• Increase perception of autonomy or personal control 
• Increased self-motivation to achieve and “go beyond the call of duty” for the organization 
• Improved sense of appreciation and respect 
• Increased levels of interpersonal trust, respect, honesty, and openness 
• Enhanced organizational performance 
 
So, employees should follow some fundamental communication guidelines to becoming a 
more empathic communicator: 
• Be assertive, confident and action oriented 
• Express opinions directly and honestly 
• Show respect for others’ opinions 
▪ Listen carefully and thank others for their input 
▪ Solicit opinions and ideas from others when making decisions. Avoid ignoring or 
verbally attacking others with a different opinion 
▪ Offer choices rather than mandates 
• Invite others to join conversations, especially in meetings 
▪ Reach out to people being excluded from conversation 
▪ When an idea is dropped without acknowledgement, bring the idea up again to 
discuss and reach closure 
• Confront problems as soon as they occur 
▪ Address the person directly, not through others 
▪ Don’t let negative feelings build up 
• Don’t spread or listen to negative gossip 
▪ Sincere disclosures about one’s self engenders trust and liking 
▪ Ensure self-disclosures are appropriate and professional 
• Ask others about themselves and how they are doing 
▪ Spend more time getting to know others 
▪ Caring about others increases trust, liking, respect and morale 
▪ Use appropriate, tasteful humor 
• Use stories when appropriate to convey positions or establish rapport 
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• Spread positive gossip 
• Request feedback after sharing ideas and opinions 
 
Of course, empathic communicators are also active listeners. They listen for both emotion 
and content to understand what the other person is saying. They also reflect back what 
the speaker is saying to show understanding. In addition, empathic communicators use 
nonjudgmental tones and avoid being too quick to offer advice or dismiss ideas. 
When receiving safety feedback, effective listeners thank the person for providing 
feedback, regardless of how well it is given, let others know if the feedback they receive is 
rude or abrasive, shouldn’t be defensive about advice to improve, collaborate with others 
on developing potential solutions and reach consensus on actions to take. 
Effective communication is an integral part of achieving an injury-free workplace. 
Organizations that promote empathic communication techniques will not only have a more 
positive work environment, but also a safer jobsite. 
 
2.6.3.5. Feedback resistance 
Many studies have shown that approximately 90% of employees agree that they should 
give feedback when observing a coworker performing an at-risk behavior and nearly 85% 
report that they are willing to give corrective feedback. However, only about 60%say they 
actually provide such feedback. These results indicate a gap between employees’ 
values/intentions and their actual behavior in terms of providing corrective feedback - and 
it signals a reluctance to warn others about at-risk behavior. When employees are asked 
about this apparent reluctance to deliver corrective feedback in response to at-risk 
behavior, common responses include the following: 
• If I give someone feedback about a safety issue, s/he will get angry. I don’t want to 
cause problems or get yelled at. 
• It’s not my job to give peers feedback. I’m not a supervisor. 
• I’ve never given peer feedback before. 
• I don’t know enough about that job to give feedback. 
• I don’t want to give feedback to someone who has more experience than I do. 
• I’m not sure I can give appropriate feedback. 
 
Academic behavioral safety reviews (Cameron & Duff, 2007; Grindle, Dickinson & 
Boettcher, 2000; McAfee & Winn, 1989; Sulzer-Azaroff, Harris & McCann, 1994) indicate 
the importance of feedback, the purpose of which is to allow people to adjust their 
performance. Many processes use various combinations of available feedback 
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mechanisms (e.g., verbal, graphical, written, tokens). Verbal feedback between the 
observed and observer at the point of contact is probably the most heavily used approach 
(Coplen, Ranney & Zuschlag, 2007). Correspondingly, behavioral safety steering 
committee members spend much time and effort recording and evaluating the quality of 
these feedback interactions, while simultaneously trying to keep the observations 
anonymous. Many also display charts in the workplace to visually report trends in 
behavioral performance. In effect, they highlight how close to 100% safe the recorded 
observations indicate people are working. In some instances, a target (assigned by a 
steering committee or set jointly by the workforce) is indicated on the chart as a 
motivational element of the process (Cameron & Duff, 2007). Some processes also use 
written feedback based on an analysis of the compiled observation data. In some 
processes, workgroups receive the data at dedicated weekly briefings. In others, steering 
committees report the summary data to management each month or give it to focus 
groups with the explicit intention of eliminating barriers to performance. Some processes 
also provide tokens or incentives as a form of feedback to reinforce good performance. 
 
2.6.4. Developing recognition and celebration plans 
Traditional safety award programs often reward people who take chances or encourage 
employees not to report incidents accurately. Too many people simply roll the dice. The 
chance of injury is usually low enough that they do not get hurt even though they take 
chances. In award programs based on going a fixed time period without an incident, such 
employees usually get the same award as employees who always comply with safety 
procedures. Furthermore, if the award is significant, and particularly if the award is 
significant to a group of employees, such programs tend to discourage the honest 
reporting of minor incidents by most employees. To avoid such shortcomings, safety 
awards and incentives should be based primarily on behavior that promote safety, such as 
conducting observations, leading safety meetings, and other activities that directly or 
indirectly contribute to the safety and well-being of co-workers. The safety award process 
provides a way of celebrating successes and expressing appreciation to employees who 
work safely as well as those who make special contributions. We should provide safety 
awards for safe behavior on the job and for activities related to maintaining for safety 
process (e.g. observations, conducting safety meetings, setting safety goals) and keep 
safety awards and incentives small., significant enough to support compliance but not 
significant enough to generate false reporting of safety data. Regardless of the kind of 
award system we design, we will have to create an internal marketing campaign to 
promote safety effort with employees. We will want to consider posters, announcements in 
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safety meetings, articles in newsletters, written thank-you notes, copies in bulletin boards 
and other methods of promoting and communicating the new process. All awards should 
include a clear, pinpointed statement of what was done to earn the award and a suitable 
statement of appreciation. 
 
2.6.5. Planning training and kickoff meetings 
Once we have planned recognition and celebrations to support the safety process we are 
ready to plan how we will introduce the process to employees, train observers, and other 
training that may be important to the success of the process. A typical agenda for the 
observer-training workshop makes employees able to understand and support the 
process, to be use the checklist and to discuss observations effectively. Employees learn 
the rationale for the behavioral approach and how the checklists were created, how to 
pinpoint behavior, hot to conduct observations and how to discuss their observations with 
their associates. When learning to conduct observations, employees need to practice 
conducting observations and discuss what they observe. 
 
2.6.6. Conducting management review 
Once you have completed planning efforts, the design team should present the behavioral 
safety process to management for its input and review. This step should be a critical 
milestone on initial schedule. This meeting is an opportunity for management to provide 
input to safety process, to approve implementation of the new process, to commit to its 
personal involvement and to approve the budget for recognition and celebrations. 
Getting management’s input and suggestions for observation system will help ensure that 
it will support implementation efforts. This will also provide an opportunity for ensuring that 
management understands each component of the behavioral safety process at each 
stage of the implementation. 
 
2.7. IMPLEMENTING BEHAVIORAL SAFETY PROCESS 
When we implement the behavioral safety process, get the observations started as soon 
as possible because they are the foundation of the process. We should ensure employees 
are trained to conduct observations and that an adequate number of trained observers are 
available in all areas of the facility. 
Management has several responsibilities for supporting the implementation efforts of the 
design team, as to discuss its vision of safety within the organization, to discuss its 
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expectations for implementing the behavioral safety process, to participate in training on 
the observation process and to model observation and feedback practices. 
The goal is to communicate the personal commitment of individual members of 
management and to create a better understanding of the formal safety vision or mission 
statement among all employees. 
 
2.8. MAINTAINING BEHAVIORAL SAFETY PROCESS 
The primary objective of the project team is to ensure the integrity of the behavioral safety 
process. Because the primary component of this process is conducting observations, the 
project team should pay special attention to ensuring that the observation process is 
functioning properly. The employee safety coordinator and the project team must work 
continuously to ensure an adequate rate of observations. Ideally, all members will 
champion the behavioral safety process. They should model practices that are aligned 
with the stated values and supportive of the process, by listening to and understanding the 
concerns of others regarding the safety process, soliciting suggestions for improving the 
process, answering questions about the behavioral safety process and providing feedback 
to other team members on conducting observations, safety practices and alignment of 
behavior with values. In their daily interactions with other employees, project team 
members must listen attentively to the concerns expressed by employees, carefully noting 
both the content and emotions expressed in such discussions. All that team members can 
do at this point is to ensure that they accurately understand their concerns, ensure that 
they fully understand the process, and solicit suggestions for addressing their concerns. 
Project team members must also be models for the kind of behavior expected of all 
employees, as in providing feedback to others on both daily work practices and 
participation in the safety observation process. Such modeling is particularly important 
because we want employees to understand that they should be using their feedback and 
observation skills all the time, not just during scheduled safety observations. Thus, 
whenever employees see an unsafe work practice or condition, they should try to correct 
the situation in the same way they would if they observed that situation during a formal 
observation. 
In addition to such day-to-day interactions, the project team need to pay special attention 
to the observation process, including reminding people to conduct their observations and, 
in particular, providing appreciative feedback to employees who have completed their 
observations, in order to let employees know we noticed their efforts. 
The project team has some basing weekly responsibilities: to develop a schedule for 
observers, reviewing past week’s observation sheets, identifying the week’s strengths and 
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areas of concern, calculating and graphing the percentage of target safe behavior, and to 
conduct weekly safety meetings, discussing observation data and establishing 
improvements target with employees. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
3.1. BBS SYSTEM IN MATERIS PAINTS ITALY S.P.A. 
Depth study of behavior-based safety management systems, whose characteristics are 
described and detailed in previous chapters, has enabled the creation of a theoretical 
knowledge essential to prepare for an effective implementation on the field. 
Materis Paints Italy S.p.A. setting has immediately proved suitable for an experimental 
application of the BBS system, mainly for the following reasons: 
 Operational setting characterized by the presence of numerous and diversified 
risks; 
 Presence of a well-established and entrenched culture of corporate safety, with a 
strong orientation of the management to continuous improvement of safety; 
 High involvement of operational staff in safety improving initiatives. 
These features have made Materis Paints Italy the ideal setting to develop a behavior-
based safety management system. 
 
3.1.1. Wendel Group 
Wendel is the reference shareholder of many companies including Materis Paints (81%). 
Wendel is one of Europe's leading listed investment firms. The Group invests in France 
and abroad, in companies that are leaders in their businesses: Bureau Veritas, Legrand, 
Saint-Gobain, Materis and Stahl. Wendel plays an active role as industry shareholder in 
these companies. It implements long-term development strategies, which involve boosting 
growth and margins of companies so as to enhance their leading market positions. 
Operational reactivity and safety of its employees at work are the core values of the 
group's culture. Through Oranje-Nassau Développement, which brings together 
opportunities for investment in growth, diversification and innovation, Wendel also invests 
in Van Gansewinkel Groep in the Netherlands, Exceet in Germany, and Mecatherm and 
Parcours in France. 
 
3.1.2. Materis Paints Group 
Adapting to be ready for a medium-term recovery in the renovation market Materis Paints 
is Europe's fourth-largest manufacturer of decorative paint, a market valued at more than 
10 billion. Materis Paints manufactures, sells and distributes a wide range of decorative 
paint and technical products to professionals and consumers. 66% of its activity is in 
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France, 28% in the rest of Europe, and 8% in emerging economies. The decorative paint 
market is mainly driven by home renovations, which makes it a resilient market offering 
long-term growth. It is generally accepted that a home needs repainting on average every 
eight years, and more often if the occupant changes. This timeframe can be shorter or 
longer depending on the country's economic activity, household confidence and 
purchasing power. The customers of Materis Paints are both professionals and 
consumers. They expect product quality, availability and excellent customer service, 
which Materis Paints provides through its portfolio of highend brands and a dense 
distribution network ensuring that it remains close to customers. Materis Paints has strong 
local brands in the top three of each of its markets (Tollens and Zolpan in France, 
Robbialac in Portugal, Max Meyer, Duco, Baldini, Settef-Cepro and Viero in Italy, 
Revetón, Alp e Duraval in Spain, Colorin and Hydra in Argentina, Arcolin in Morocco and 
Claessens in Switzerland). Another of Materis Paints’ major strengths is that it generates 
more than 60% of its sales in its integrated distribution network of close to 400 stores. 
This network distributes Materis Paints along with a select range of complementary 
products, such as tools or floor and wall coverings, to cater to the needs of a broad and 
diverse customer base. 28% of its sales come from independent retailers and 11% from 
large DIY stores. Materis Paints is also growing rapidly in the external thermal insulation 
sector. For more than 10 years, Materis Paints has posted average annual sales growth of 
9%. Its profitability suffered in 2011 and 2012 for two reasons: firstly, due to its significant 
exposure to southern Europe, which was a vector for high growth in the last decade, but 
which has since been experiencing difficult economic conditions. Since 2008, sales 
volume has fallen by almost a quarter in Italy and by half in Spain and Portugal combined. 
Secondly, like the other players in the decorative paint market, Materis Paints had to cope 
with a steep increase in the prices of raw materials, especially titanium dioxide, an 
essential component in the formulation of decorative paints. Performance significantly 
improved in 2013 following the implementation of a major turnaround plan, which led to a 
significant reduction of costs. In order to be ready to take full advantage of market 
recovery in 2014-2015, Materis Paints and its new CEO, Bertrand Dumazy, have been 
working since autumn 2012 to reorganize the supply chain, sales and marketing functions, 
implement improved distribution concepts, and strengthen customer loyalty. 
Materis is composed of four businesses: Admixtures, Aluminates, Mortars and Paints. 
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Figure 3.1 
3.1.3. Materis Paints Italy 
Materis Paints Italy is a leader in the Italian market for the production of paints for building 
and it is part of the international group Materis Paints. Thanks to its portfolio of prestigious 
brands, including MaxMeyer, Baldini Vernici, Duco, Tollens, Settef, Cepro, Viero, Mister 
Color, Lo Specialista di Mister Color, and a competitive, complete and diversified multi-
channel strategy, Materis Paints Italy has a successful presence in all distribution 
channels. In Italy Materis Paints operates in five different sites located in Novate Milanese 
(Milan), San Miniato (Pisa), Porcari (Lucca), Resana (Treviso) and Casavatore (Naples). 
In this context, Resana’s production site has a dominant position from both operational 
and managerial point of view. 
 
3.2. RESANA’S PLANT 
Materis Paints Italy S.p.A. industrial site of Resana is located by the early ‘60s in the north 
area of the town of Resana on a fully fenced plot of approximately 44.000 m2, with 10.000 
m2 occupied by buildings. On the north side the plant adjoins the town of Castelfranco 
Veneto and farmed fields, while on the south it adjoins via Piagnon and with a group of 
civil and industrial buildings. The plant is crossed in the direction north to south from the 
river Roggia Musonello that determines the boundary between the portion of the plant 
belonging to the municipality of Resana, the north side, and the one belonging to the 
municipality of Castelfranco Veneto, the south side. There are farmed fields on the west 
side of the plant while in the east the plant adjoins the road SR 245 Via Castellana and a 
group of fields, a small restaurant and the property of Aimeri Ambiente Srl. Over the last 
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two decades the production structure has experienced some significant developments that 
can be summarized thus: 
 partition of production departments located in the north main building in:  
- wall coverings shop floor; 
- water paints shop floor; 
 creation of new R&D and quality control laboratory on the ground floor of the same 
building; 
 construction of a new storage area for bulk products, silos gallery; 
 purchase and installation of new production machines (plants Cobalt and Zanelli); 
 installation of new automatic packaging machines; 
 complete dismantling of the purification plant and its reconstruction with advanced 
technology; 
 closure of solvent-based paints production moved to another Materis Paints 
production site; 
 moving sales office to another Materis Paints location; 
 adaptation of the building "E", once used to solvent-based paints production, in the 
new finished goods warehouse; subsequent moving of the building of the logistics 
department, currently located in the building "M". 
From 2011 until 2013 the Resana site layout has experienced some changes to optimize 
and rationalize the production flow. In particular: 
 decommissioning of premixed plant; 
 moving of additives warehouse to the building previously used as a paint factory; 
 moving of industrial washing in a new place outside the main hall; 
 moving of industrial colorimeter and other machines located in the production area 
Fless Coat in the old premixed and additives area; 
At the moment the plant extends along the road SR 245 Via Castellana, on two main 
areas. In the north area lies the raw materials and additives warehouse. 
Manufacturing adhesives, mixers and packaging production departments are located in 
the south, west and south-east areas. Along the north-east of the building used as 
production area are located the quality control laboratory and the technical departments of 
planning, management and industrial services. 
An overview of the area occupied by the plant, with schematic indication of the intended 
use of the individual areas with their buildings, it is shown in the figure of the general plan 
below: 
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Figure 3.2 
 
3.2.1. Production processes 
This section provides synthetic elements about the activities and productive cycles. 
Production is performed in two different departments: the first one dedicated to water-
based paints and the second one in siding products. Finished products are stored in a 
main warehouse located in the south area of the plant, while the materials for packaging 
are situated in a dedicated warehouse in building G and in the outside areas of the west 
area over the Roggia Musonello. 
Productive cycle of the plant, for production and packaging of paints and wall coverings is 
summarized below: 
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Raw material supply
Raw material and 
additive warehouse
Resin storage tanks
Siding production
Water paints 
production
Siding packaging
Water paints 
packaging
Finished products storage
 
Figure 3.3 
 
3.2.1.1. Siding production 
The siding production area is located along the north-east of the central body of the 
production department, within the main gallery of the building. Within the department the 
processing cycle includes the pickup of all raw materials needed for production (resins, 
fillers, additives) using hoppers or tanks in which are dosed and then loaded into the 
machine. The working cycle for siding products follows the following steps: 
1. Raw materials pickup and storage in the containers (hopper, tank); 
2. Mixing of raw materials and additives using special mixers with variable speed inverter  
3. Inspection and testing of the product: control of physical, chemical and colorimetric 
features; 
4. Packaging through packaging machines. 
 
3.2.1.2. Water paints production 
The water paints production area is located along in the north-west area of the central 
body of the production department, on two separate lofts (Cobalt and Cowless). 
Within the shop floor the processing cycle includes pickup of the raw materials by an 
automatic system controlled by a dedicated PLC for the Cobalt plant as well as partly for 
the Cowless plant. Raw materials for other production areas are taken through hoppers or 
tanks. The pickup of the raw materials needs pumps, screw conveyors from the many 
storage tanks and storage silos. 
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In addition to the automatically conveyed raw materials are still present substances whose 
handling is done manually through direct pickup from storage locations. 
The working cycle for water based products follows the following steps: 
1. Raw materials pickup, storage in the containers and moving to the mixers 
(automatically if possible); 
2. Mixing of raw materials; 
3. Inspection and testing of the product: control of physical, chemical and colorimetric 
features; 
4. Packaging in case of the finished product, or moving in the tanks in case of semi-
finished product. 
For the production of water-based paints are used water, kaolins, dust and liquid 
carbonates, various additives, cellulose, vinyl and acrylic aqueous emulsions. 
 
3.2.1.3. Laboratory 
Laboratory is located on the ground floor, next to the technical departments, and is 
dedicated to quality control of the products. In the laboratory there are a technical office 
and areas with the necessary equipment for products and raw materials testing. Here 
employees conduct technological tests on raw materials, intermediate products and 
finished products. For these tests are used: stirrers, various analytical tools, electric 
heater, kiln for testing the quality of the finished products, etc. 
 
3.2.1.4. Finished goods warehouse 
The finished goods warehouse is located in the building E, owned by Materis Paints Italy 
S.p.A. inside the plant. Pallets from Production waiting to be sent to the customer are 
stored here in dedicated racks. Shipment carriers loaded by Materis personnel arrive daily 
in front of the warehouse. 
 
3.2.2. Safety management 
Obligations related to the organization and implementation of the corporate safety system 
are linked to the hierarchical structure of the company and to the function of the health 
and safety manager (RSPP), as well as to the figures of the competent doctor and the 
workers’ safety representative (RLS). From the first point of view the focus goes to the 
figures of the employer, supervisor and employer. The figures of the prevention and 
protection are: 
 Prevention and Protection Service Manager (RSPP); 
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 assigned to the prevention and protection service (ASPP); 
 workers assigned to fire prevention, evacuation in case of serious and immediate 
danger, rescue, first aid and emergency management. 
Then we have the figure of the competent doctor and the workers’ safety representative, 
elected or chosen by the workers within the trade union representatives in the company. 
The structure described above includes following figures: 
 Employer 
 Prevention and Protection Service 
 Workers’ safety representative 
 Competent doctor 
 Workers 
 Workers with emergency management assignment 
 Supervisors 
Regular meetings are conducted regularly in compliance with the aspects required by 
Legislative Decree no. 81/2008 and with the participation of the proper safety business 
figures. 
 
3.3. BBS APPLICATION SCENERY 
Mapping and full understanding of operational activities is essential for the proper 
structuring of the BBS process, especially in the case of the introduction of a system, such 
as behavioral safety, which is based on the workers active participation and behavior. This 
chapter contains a description of the different activities that are routinely performed within 
that departments that have been chosen by Materis Paints Italy for a first application of 
the system of behavioral safety. 
The choice of the application context involved three different departments: Production, 
Laboratory and Warehouse. The peculiarity of the activities within these departments has 
required the need to create three separate and dedicated checklist. 
 
3.3.1. Types of risk 
Workers’ activity are potential sources of many and various risks to their health and 
safety. Thanks to the consultation of the company Risk Assessment Document (DVR) and 
attached job-boards containing the types of risk divided by occupation it was possible to 
identify the different categories of risk. The table below shows the different types of risk 
present in the studied departments, classified by: 
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 Damage Impact (DI): it considers damage degree of permanence, about physical 
damages on both employees and machines; 
 Occurrence Frequency (OF): it refers to the predictability of the occurrence of a 
failure that can determine consequences to people's health and environment; 
 Activity Frequency (FA): it represents degree of continuity that characterizes the 
activities that may result in a negative consequence on the level of occupational 
safety on workplace 
The above mentioned values, once assigned to the category of risk, flow into the 
calculation of a coefficient of significance which match with a certain level of risk. The 
value of Risk Significance (RS) for every single aspect is calculated by using the following 
formula: 
 
RS = (OF + AF) * DI 
 
Where (OF + AF) represents the probability of occurrence between 1 and 5. Through the 
elaboration of the values assigned to each parameter we can classify, according to the 
matrix below, the different safety risk significance degrees: 
 
P
R
O
B
A
B
IL
IT
Y
 O
F
 O
C
C
U
R
R
E
N
C
E
 
5 5 10 15 20 25 
4 4 8 12 16 20 
3 3 6 9 12 20 
2 2 4 6 8 10 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
 1 2 3 4 5 
DAMAGE IMPACT 
Table 3.1 
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These values are described in detail in the following table: 
 
RS value Level 
Risk significance 
description 
Measures 
X < 4 Negligible risk 
The risks are not significant 
and cannot reasonably be 
expected to increase in the 
future 
It is not necessary to take 
the measurement and 
monitoring activities except 
in cases where their 
implementation is scheduled 
for the fulfillment of legal 
obligations or for business 
needs which go beyond 
safety issues 
4 ≤ X < 6 Low risk 
It is unlikely the occurrence 
of accidents or diseases with 
serious consequences for 
people or the risks to 
humans are low regardless 
of their frequency 
Maintaining the current 
situation and evaluate the 
opportunity to introduce new 
operational criteria and/or 
technologies 
6 ≤ X < 6 Medium risk 
The risks involved can be 
high and it is necessary to 
define criteria for minimizing 
the relative impact and / or 
frequency 
Define control systems, to 
minimize the possibility of 
further short-term 
exposures. Determine 
additional measures to 
ensure risk reduction 
through organizational 
procedures 
X > 10 High risk 
There is the real possibility of 
occurrence of accidents or 
diseases with serious 
consequences for people 
Identify and implement 
immediate measures to 
prevent and control risk 
exposure 
Table 3.2 
 
Of course, thanks to the work of prevention and protection done by the company, risks in 
the workplace have been brought to a low or negligible as to make possible the safe 
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execution of the different activities. However the knowledge of the different types of risks 
was extremely useful for the correct assessment of the activities and related risks. 
 
3.3.2. Personal Protective Equipment 
During the risk assessment it was decided to adopt a set of Personal Protective 
Equipment as a necessary element of protection from risks of accident. These devices, in 
compliance with the dictation by Title III of Legislative Decree 81/08, are used in the 
presence of risks that cannot be avoided or reduced sufficiently by technical preventive 
measures, shared protection means, measures, methods and procedures for work 
organization. 
The need for Personal Protective Equipment adoption was taken on the basis of risk 
assessment conducted for similar operating areas and tasks; this involves choosing 
different devices depending on the activity. In summary, we can identify the following 
categories of PPE: 
 
Leg protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Shoes • All staff who can access to 
the production departments 
and warehouses 
Marc. CE standard EN 3451 
(general features) - S3 
Antistatic A 
Heel energy absorption E 
Water penetration-resistant 
uppers WRU 
Waterproof WR 
Midsole P 
Outsole resistance to hot 
contact HRO 
Insulation against heat HI 
Insulation against cold CI 
Slip resistance ENV 13287 
Gumboots • Industrial washing Marc. CE standard EN 345 - 
S5 
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Hearing protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Semi-insert ear plugs • Maintenance 
• Cowless mixers 
• Mobile tanks mixers 
• Cobalt mixers 
• Packaging 
• Horizontal mixers 
Marc. CE standard EN 352 
Noise reduction 23 dB 
Ear muffs • Maintenance 
• Mobile tanks mixers 
• Washing 
Marc. CE standard EN 352-
1 
Noise reduction 27 dB 
 
 
Hand protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Multi-use gloves for 
mechanical risk. Non 
continuous use. 
• Production 
• Maintenance 
• Packaging 
NBR gloves 
Marc. CE standard EN 388 
Resistance 4.2.2.1 
Long nitrile gloves for 
chemical risk. Non 
continuous use. 
• Raw material warehouse 
• Production 
• Maintenance 
• Laboratory 
Model CE standard EN 388 
e EN 374 
Resistance to acids, oils, 
solvents and hazardous 
chemicals materials 
Single-use nitrile gloves for 
short or accidental contacts 
• Laboratory Marc. CE standard EN 374 
Multi-use gloves for 
mechanical risk 
• Production 
• Packaging 
• Warehouse 
• Maintenance 
• Tintometer 
• Laboratory 
Gloves made filaments 
coated polyurethane 
Marc. CE standard EN 388 
Resistance 4.3.4.2 
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Respiratory protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Single-use filter facemask 
for short-term exposure to 
dust 
• Production 
• Maintenance 
• Laboratory 
EN 149: 2001 - FFP2 
Model: with exhalation valve 
Single-use filter facemask 
for short-term exposure to 
quartz 
• Cowless mixer EN 149: 2001 - FFP3 
Model: with exhalation valve 
Half-mask with double filter • Specific activity Various brands CE 194 - EN 
140-141 filter ABEK1 
 
 
Eye protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Protective goggles • Whole plant CE EN 166 
Masks with adiactinic glass • Welding - 
 
 
Head protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Safety helmet • Maintenance Various brands EN 397 
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Fall protection 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Harness and lanyard • Maintenance EN 361-355 
 
 
Protective clothing 
 
PPE Function or task 
Brand / model / type or 
other features 
Single-use coveralls for 
operations with possible 
contact with hazardous 
liquids 
• Raw material warehouse Tyvek EN 0120 
Jacket and pants • Whole plant 100% cotton 
Jacket and pants • Maintenance 100% cotton with high 
visibility stripes 
Cotton shirt and pants • Whole plant 100% cotton 
White coat • Laboratory 100% cotton 
Table 3.3 
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3.4. BBS PROJECT 
Since 2014, Materis Paints Italy has decided, in a perspective of continuous improvement 
of health and safety performance of the company, to gradually introduce the BBS system 
within its operational organization. 
The goal of the system is to get the spontaneous emission of safe behavior by workers, 
through their active participation in the safety management process in the workplace. BBS 
is therefore an employee-driven process: the system must be designed and structured to 
be implemented, constantly improved and guided by workers, who have a leading role in 
its implementation. 
Of course, the implementation of a Behavior-Based Safety process requires the 
cooperation and involvement of all company personnel; in particular management 
commitment is essential, which should be an example and be at the forefront in the 
implementation of safe behavior. 
The positive results obtained from Materis Paints Italy in the BBS pilot project 
implemented in 2014 the plant of Porcari (LU) have driven the company to involve other 
sites of the group in the project, which was extended to the production plant in Resana 
(TV) and that will continue with the implementation of the system in the storage center of 
San Miniato (PI). 
 
3.4.1. Project objective 
The process of behavioral safety allows the spread in the company of a true culture of 
safety based on the adoption of safe behavior. This significantly increases the company's 
performance in the field of safety, achieving long-term results well above those still 
reachable only with an approach of inspection and sanctions. 
The first step of the project (Safety Assessment) consisted of an initial analysis of the 
operational situation in order to understand the nature of the activities and to map 
production processes. This phase appears to be essential for the proper structuring of an 
effective and integrated behavioral safety process. All this information made it possible to 
outline a precise and well-defined context in which to develop the BBS system. 
The introduction of BBS in the plant of Resana had a dual macro-objectives: 
 Bring the positive experience of Porcari within the operational reality of Resana, 
trying to replicate the excellent results and making sure that the operational staff 
knows and acquires familiarity with BBS system; 
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 Extend the scope of the system to other types of operations, other than the mere 
production characterizing the context of Materis Paints. The project BBS involved 
for the first time the activities of packaging, storage and laboratory. 
Finally, a very important feature which differentiated the Resana project compared to 
Porcari’s is about the project group involvement. The presence of SGS Sertec technical 
personnel was not continuous as in the case of Porcari; this has been a challenge for all 
members of the group and for Materis Paints Italy, which has been involved in the whole 
implementation of the project. 
 
3.4.2. Project team 
One of the most important factors for the success of a BBS system is to establish a team 
of people made up of elements that cooperate in the planning and implementation of the 
project. 
The choice of the members of the project team is one of the first activities to be done 
immediately after the approval of the BBS by management and has a strategic importance 
for the success of the system. The presence of figures from different operating 
background gives the project team the fundamental heterogeneity so that it can make 
right choices regarding the behavioral safety system. The following table shows the 
composition of the BBS project group for the introduction of the system in the Materis 
Paints Italy plant of Resana: 
Group member Role 
Innocenti Paolo EHS & Quality System Manager 
Conzo Gennaro Plant Health and Safety Manager 
Padovan Cristian Site Manager 
Ferlin Enrico Production Manager 
Ceccherini Nicolò External SGS consultant 
Pandolfi Filippo External SGS consultant 
Table 3.4 
The role of the project team is important especially in the initial stage of the process of 
observation: members of the project team make the first observations and then will 
support workers in daily observations and resolving doubts and problems. 
At the end of each week, usually the project group meets to: 
 Analyze the performance of the observation process; 
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 Analyze weekly data extrapolated from observations; 
 Resolve any problems. 
Finally, it is essential that the project team has a role as sponsor of the project. You can 
imagine how a system of this kind, based on the direct involvement of employees, can 
easily lose effectiveness if not properly supported and sponsored by the company 
management. 
The real difference between the implementation of BBS system in the plant of Resana and 
Porcari is the direct participation of the project team. After conducting an initial inspection 
followed by a training session and a few hours of coaching on the field, SGS Sertec 
consultants have remotely supported Materis personnel, collecting by email the checklist 
compiled by the staff and weekly analyzing obtained data. This fact has allowed Materis 
staff to approach more directly to the project and to manage everyday problems 
encountered in the implementation of this kind of system. 
 
3.4.3. Involved areas and activities 
BBS project implemented in the Materis Paints Italy plant of Resana (TV) consisted in the 
development of a behavioral safety system inside of three operational departments that 
characterize the plant. Compared to the pilot implementation project in the plant of 
Porcari, which involved only the production department, it was decided to expand the 
scope of the system by extending to the activities of packaging, warehouse and QC 
laboratory. 
We identified three main areas of observation: 
 Production and Packaging; 
 Warehouse; 
 Laboratory. 
The observation process has lasted a total of five weeks. In the following paragraphs we 
describe observed activity data and the number of observations made within each 
department. 
 
  
67 
 
3.4.3.1. Observation area 
The tables and graphs below show the distribution of the number of observations within 
the different areas, during the entire observation period (5 weeks). 
 
Production and Packaging 
AREA Observations 
Fixed tanks 100 
Mixer 47 
Mobile tanks 43 
Packaging 109 
Additive 20 
Washing 21 
TOTAL 340 
Table 3.5 
 
Figure 3.4 
 
Warehouse 
AREA Observations 
Inside 40 
Outside 33 
TOTAL 73 
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Table 3.6 
 
Figure 3.5 
 
Laboratory 
AREA Observations 
QC Laboratory 36 
Colorimetry 10 
TOTAL 46 
Table 3.7 
 
Figure 3.6 
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3.4.3.2. Observed activities per area 
The tables and graphs below show the distribution of the number of observations for the 
different activities, during the entire observation period (5 weeks). 
 
Production and Packaging 
AREA Observations 
Raw material preparation 26 
Product loading 95 
Sampling 2 
Tub positioning 14 
Tub storage 1 
Machine cleaning 23 
Tub washing 21 
Packaging 156 
Other 7 
TOTAL 345 
Table 3.8 
 
Figure 3.7 
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Warehouse 
AREA Observations 
Vehicle loading / unloading 25 
Pallet handling / storage 19 
Pallet wrapping 11 
Other 18 
TOTAL 73 
Table 3.9 
 
Figure 3.8 
 
Laboratory 
AREA Observations 
Sample control / analysis 29 
Machines use (tintometer, mixer) 14 
Buckets handling 2 
Tools calibration 1 
Other 7 
TOTAL 53 
Table 3.10 
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Figure 3.9 
 
3.4.4. Information, education and training 
During the introduction of BBS information, education and training activities have the 
objective of creating necessary know-how and skills to the implementation of the process 
of behavioral safety. 
Even during the Resana project a short training course was structured and planned both 
for the project team and the operational staff. 
 
For an effective BBS system, all workers must be kept informed on the activities and 
results of the process of behavioral safety, in order to create fertile ground for the 
emergence and spread of the culture of safety. 
The information for the staff involved in the project was constantly obtained by: 
 Design, printing and posting of wall charts within the various departments with 
reminder function for the conduction of observations; 
 Distributing informative brochures to staff during the training session; 
 Using the Safety Corner as an opportunity for clarifications, explanations and 
discussions, both during the introduction of the project and the observations; 
 Diffusion of the project final results and achievements. 
 
Staff education was done in two hours lesson in the training room of the plant, during 
which the staff of Materis was put in a position to understand and support the process, to 
use the checklist and to discuss with the observed during the observations. 
In particular observers were instructed about: 
 BBS basics; 
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 Checklist compilation; 
 Conducting observations; 
 Feedback to observed employees. 
It is essential that observers fully understand what is the right approach for interacting with 
those being observed, in order to be able to extract the necessary information from 
observation and leave a positive experience to the observed worker. However the training 
activity did not end with the short session in the classroom; members of the project team 
and supervisors continued to train workers on the correct use of the checklist until the end 
of the observations. 
Once the observation checklist is ready and the information and education of personnel is 
complete, it is necessary to train those who are going to do observations. The observation 
process must involve all workers, both in the role of observers and observed, so the 
training activity involves the entire workforce present in the areas that are going to be 
observed (Production and Packaging, Warehouse and Laboratory). 
The training of the observers is initially translated into an activity of support on the field by 
supervisors and more experienced observers, in order to increase the number of involved 
operators. If the first week of introduction of the observations were conducted only by 
members of the project team together with the specific supervisor, from the second week 
a growing number of Materis operators has been involved in the observation process, 
showing significant participation and involvement. 
 
3.4.5. Observers 
Observation process is the core of the Behavior-Based Safety. BBS system is based on 
the observation of the behavior of workers by the workers themselves in the role of 
observers. 
In the Resana project BBS system initially involved supervisors, production managers and 
Health and Safety Manager in the first week of observations and, from the second week of 
observations, all operators of the involved departments. Observers have conducted 
observations daily, taking the checklist from the dedicated area in each department and 
give them back compiled at the end of shift to the production office. 
The following table shows the general data related to the five weeks observations: 
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Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 TOTAL 
Observers 
 Project 
team 
 Supervisors 
 Project team 
 Supervisors 
 Workers 
 Project 
team 
 Supervisors 
 Workers 
 Project team 
 Supervisors 
 Workers 
 Project 
team 
 Supervisors 
 Workers 
 
Completed 
observations 
33 103 65 116 133 450 
Observed 
behavior 
289 1027 617 1098 1337 4368 
Table 3.11 
All the operators have shown a significant involvement in the initiative, by filling out the 
daily checklist and helping to reinforce good behavior by providing feedback to their 
coworkers. 
Observation is in fact followed by the provision of feedback to the observed worker, in 
order to promote both the strengthening of safety behavior (positive feedback) and to 
correct any at risk behavior (corrective feedback). 
The feedback process develops through three steps: 
1. description of the observed behavior to the worker; 
2. discussion of the potential impact of at risk behavior on workers; 
3. listening to the opinion of the worker and, in case of corrective feedback, proposal 
for necessary corrections to the observed behavior. 
In case of corrective feedback the employee may invoke reasons of behavior he held: all 
this information has been recorded by the observers on the checklist and is very useful in 
order to take measures regarding the improvement of safety standards. The Safety 
Corner was once again crucial as an opportunity to remind all personnel to release the 
feedback and note any relevant to safety comments. 
 
3.4.6. Observed behavior 
Following the initial analysis, the implementation of all relevant information to understand 
activities and training of the project team, we moved to the definition of the target 
behavior. For this purpose it was necessary to enter as far as possible in contact with the 
daily operational reality, carefully observing not only the operational phases of the 
different activities, but also behavior and attitudes of the operating personnel. 
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The acquisition of corporate documents of various types was extremely important for the 
identification and correct definition of the target behavior. In fact, thanks to the 
consultation of the company Risk Assessment Document (DVR) and job-boards attached 
to it containing the types of risk divided by operative occupation it was possible to identify 
the different categories of risk in relation to the employees of Production and Packaging, 
Warehouse and Laboratory. 
Thanks to the analysis of reports and internal operating procedures it is possible to 
identify safety requirements, and then keep them under control through the observations 
of the BBS system. 
The definition of safety behavior directly impacts the effectiveness of the BBS system as 
the definitions themselves are written on the back of the checklist used to conduct 
observations: according to these definitions, observers are not only able to distinguish 
safe behavior and "at risk" behavior, but they may also illustrate the correct behavior to 
the worker observed during feedback. 
The following tables show, for each item that you chose to observe and then to place in 
three different checklist, the number of safe, at risk and not observable behavior. 
 
Production and Packaging 
Behavior Safe At risk N.O. 
1.1.     Body position during lift, grab or push 292 17 30 
1.2.     Body parts at safety distance 303 8 28 
2.1.     Tidy up and cleaning 316 19 4 
2.2.     Leaving workplace 94 7 238 
2.3.     Footpaths use 122 2 215 
3.1.     Forklift driving 124 1 214 
3.2.     Forklift / pallet jack loading 129 5 205 
3.3.     Tools and equipment use 269 4 66 
3.4.     Safe machines use 274 9 56 
3.5.     Tub securing 147 3 189 
4.1.     Eye protection 306 22 11 
4.2.     Hand protection 320 17 2 
4.3.     Clothing and shoes 337 2 0 
4.4.     Respiratory protection 97 13 229 
4.5.     Fall protection 64 6 269 
4.6.     Hearing protection 118 16 205 
TOTAL 3312 151 1961 
Table 3.12 
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Warehouse 
Behavior Safe At risk N.O. 
1.1.     Body position during lift, grab or push 33 0 32 
1.2.     Body parts at safety distance 30 0 35 
2.1.     Tidy up and cleaning 63 0 2 
2.2.     Leaving workplace 44 1 20 
2.3.     Footpaths use 45 1 19 
2.3.     Traffic and access 58 2 5 
3.1.     Forklift driving 50 3 12 
3.2.     Forklift / pallet jack loading 50 1 14 
3.3.     Tools, machines and equipment use 38 0 27 
3.4.     Shelving storage 24 0 41 
4.1.     Eye protection 13 0 52 
4.2.     Hand protection 25 2 38 
4.3.     Clothing and shoes 64 1 0 
4.6.     External personnel control 37 2 26 
TOTAL 574 13 323 
Table 3.13 
Laboratory 
Behavior Safe At risk N.O. 
1.1.     Body position during lift, grab or push 18 1 27 
1.2.     Body parts at safety distance 22 0 24 
2.1.     Tidy up and cleaning 40 6 0 
2.2.     Leaving workplace 23 0 23 
2.3.     Laboratory activity 38 4 4 
3.3.     Tools and equipment use 39 1 6 
3.4.     Safe machines use 28 4 14 
4.1.     Eye protection 12 9 25 
4.2.     Hand protection 15 9 22 
4.3.     Clothing and shoes 43 3 0 
4.4.     Respiratory protection 2 1 43 
TOTAL 280 38 188 
Table 3.14 
It should be noted that the observation checklist is a dynamic tool that must change 
according to the changing needs of the workplace and at the same time should be stable 
for periods long enough to allow you to document the achievement of the purpose. 
It was therefore possible to adapt it, removing or changing the areas and activities which 
correspond to a small number of observations, reformulating them with obtained 
information as a result of the observations. 
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3.5. DATA ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the observation data of a BBS process allows to achieve success 
significantly higher compared to the use of data about rate of accidents, which are simply 
a measure of the result. 
The observation process involve actively workers activities before someone gets hurt and 
can evaluate the effectiveness of specific initiatives to improve safety. 
The following tables show the aggregate results extrapolated from five weeks of 
observations, conducted in the period from mid-May to mid-June 2015. 
 
Production and Packaging 
 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 TOTAL 
Completed observations 21 83 44 91 100 339 
Observed behavior 214 874 449 887 1039 3463 
Safe behavior 191 829 437 847 1008 3312 
At risk behavior 23 45 12 40 31 151 
Not observable behavior 122 454 255 569 561 1961 
Table 3.15 
Warehouse 
 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 TOTAL 
Completed observations 6 16 10 12 21 65 
Observed behavior 41 133 85 117 211 587 
Safe behavior 37 128 81 117 211 574 
At risk behavior 4 5 4 0 0 13 
Not observable behavior 43 91 55 51 83 323 
Table 3.16 
Laboratory 
 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 TOTAL 
Completed observations 6 4 11 13 12 46 
Observed behavior 34 20 83 94 87 318 
Safe behavior 22 19 76 82 81 280 
At risk behavior 12 1 7 12 6 38 
Not observable behavior 32 24 38 49 45 188 
Table 3.17 
The following paragraphs report the processing and analysis of extracted data, which 
allowed to elaborate some statistics about the implementation of safe behavior. 
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3.5.1. Safe and at risk behavior 
The graphs below show, for each department, the ratio of safe behavior and at risk 
behavior for each week of observations: 
 
 
Figure 3.10 
 
Figure 3.11 
 
Figure 3.12 
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3.5.2. Behavior trend 
The following graphs show the trend of the rate of safety behavior for each department. 
 
Production and Packaging 
In the production area, including the activities of packaging, there was an increase of safe 
behavior of 8%. The chart below shows this trend: 
 
Figure 3.13 
 
Warehouse 
Warehouse area has increased safe behavior of 10%. In particular the last two weeks of 
observations were characterized by the complete absence of at risk behavior. 
The chart below shows the above-mentioned trend: 
 
Figure 3.14 
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Laboratory 
Finally, the laboratory area has increased safe behavior of 28%. 
The chart below shows the above-mentioned trend: 
 
Figure 3.15 
 
In general, we noted an average increase of safe behavior of 15% during the five weeks 
of observation and implementation of the BBS system. 
 
3.5.3. Observability 
Another useful data to analyze is the observability of behavior, which is the number of 
observed behavior on the total observable. 
 
Observability = Observed Behavior / (Observed Behavior + Not Observable Behavior) 
 
 
Observability gives a quantitative measure of the ability of operators to use the checklist 
and to recognize and distinguish safe behavior by at risk ones; daily use of the checklist 
usually means that this ability develops resulting in an increase of observability of 
behavior. 
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Production and Packaging 
In the Production and Packaging area the value of observability recorded at the end of the 
observation period was not characterized by an noteworthy increase: this can be 
explained by a not always continuous support by the project team. The following graphs 
show the above-mentioned trend: 
 
 
Figure 3.16 
 
 
Figure 3.17 
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Warehouse 
In the warehouse there was a 23% increase of the observability of behavior. This data is a 
sign of growth of the observers capacity and the acquisition of familiarity with the 
checklist. This data is however also due to the smaller number of performed activities, as 
well as the reduction of their complexity. The following graphs show the above-mentioned 
trend: 
 
 
Figure 3.18 
 
 
Figure 3.19 
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Laboratory 
In the laboratory there was an increase of 14% of the observability of behavior. Again this 
data is a sign of growth of the observers capacity and the acquisition of familiarity with the 
checklist. The data is however also due to the smaller number of performed activities, as 
well as the reduction of their complexity. The following graphs show the above-mentioned 
trend: 
 
Figure 3.20 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21 
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3.5.4. At risk behavior 
This analysis has particularly allowed to identify possible problem areas related to work 
activities. This data can help to set goals for improvement, based on what has been done 
and what could be done more safely. 
 
Production and Packaging 
In this department behavior that have shown the most critical concern mainly the use of 
PPE for hearing protection and respiratory protection. 
Behavior  Safety % 
Clothing and shoes 99% 
Forklift driving 99% 
Tools and equipment use 99% 
Footpaths use 98% 
Tub securing 98% 
Body parts at safety distance 97% 
Safe machines use 97% 
Forklift / pallet jack loading 96% 
Hand protection 95% 
Body position during lift, grab or push 94% 
Tidy up and cleaning 94% 
Eye protection 93% 
Leaving workplace 93% 
Fall protection 91% 
Respiratory protection 88% 
Hearing protection 88% 
Table 3.18 
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Warehouse 
In the warehouse behavior that have shown the most critical concern mainly the use of 
PPE for hand protection and the use of the forklift. 
Behavior Safety % 
Body position during lift, grab or push 100% 
Body parts at safety distance 100% 
Tidy up and cleaning 100% 
Tools, machines and equipment use 100% 
Shelving storage 100% 
Eye protection 100% 
Clothing and shoes 98% 
Forklift / pallet jack loading 98% 
Footpaths use 98% 
Leaving workplace 98% 
Traffic and access 97% 
External personnel control 95% 
Forklift driving 94% 
Hand protection 93% 
Table 3.19 
Laboratory 
In the laboratory behavior that have shown the most critical concern mainly the use of 
PPE for eye, hand and respiratory protection. 
Behavior Safety % 
Body parts at safety distance 100% 
Leaving workplace 100% 
Tools and equipment use 98% 
Body position during lift, grab or push 95% 
Clothing and shoes 93% 
Laboratory activity 90% 
Safe machines use 88% 
Safe machines use 87% 
Respiratory protection 67% 
Hand protection 63% 
Eye protection 57% 
Table 3.20 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. RESULTS 
The commitment of Materis Paints Italy to provide all the necessary resources, along with 
the availability and the strong involvement of all those who were called to give their 
contribution to the project, allowed the efficient and quick introduction of BBS system 
within the plant of Resana. 
This introduction and first implementation of the BBS system helped achieving the 
following results in the different departments: 
 
SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE 
SAFE BEHAVIOR % 
AREA Observation start Observation end ∆ 
Production and 
Packaging 
89% 97% + 8% 
Warehouse 90% 100% + 10% 
Laboratory 65% 93% + 28% 
Table 4.1 
An additional parameter indicating the beneficial effect of the introduction of BBS is the 
behavior observability. This data, obtained from the ratio between the observed and 
observable behavior, continually grew. This reflects the increase of the capacity of 
observers and the acquisition of more familiarity with the checklist. In particular we 
observed the following results in the different departments: 
 
OBSERVABILITY OBSERVABLE BEHAVIOR % 
AREA Observation start Observation end ∆ 
Production and 
Packaging 
64% 65% + 1% 
Warehouse 49% 72% + 23% 
Laboratory 52% 66% + 14% 
Table 4.2 
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We can therefore say that with the introduction of the BBS system inside the Materis 
Paints Resana plant was possible to: 
 Reduce the frequency of at risk behavior, simultaneously increasing the 
implementation of safe behavior previously identified and well defined; 
 Involve employees in the safety management process, increasing their knowledge 
and their ability to identify at risk behavior through the use of observation checklist; 
 Highlight areas for health and safety improvements, pointing out ideas and 
constructive comments that will enable to focused actions.  
 Strengthen already firmly safety culture of Materis Paints, with the ultimate goal of 
inducing more and more workers to keep and maintain safe behavior over time, 
with continuous improvement of the performance of occupational health and 
safety. 
 
4.2. IMPROVEMENT AREAS 
Analysis of data and results of the implementation of BBS makes possible to seize a 
number of suggestions for improvement regarding: 
 the general features of the implemented BBS system; 
 the characteristics of the observation process; 
 the safety performance. 
While some items for improvement are only applicable to the operational environment of 
the plant of Resana, other ideas may be useful in the following implementation of the BBS 
system in other Materis Paints sites. 
 
4.2.1. System features 
An area of possible improvement and further development for greater efficiency of the 
BBS system can be represented by the possibility of linking the results achieved by the 
participants with a reward system that encourages participation in the BBS process, 
promoting the adoption of safety behavior. 
The rewards can be associated both to the implementation of effective safety behavior (for 
example by rewarding workers of a single department) and the employee participation to 
the system implementation, for example by rewarding departments and/or observers who 
conducted more observations or have provided useful and detailed information, making 
proposals for improvement. 
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The reward system can be implemented through: 
 small entities rewards; 
 thanks written notes; 
 communications posted on the notice boards of the department. 
In particular, in the operating of Materis Paints, the Safety Corner could be again the 
occasion for the official handover of rewards and incentives, so that all workers can 
understand clearly the meaning of the initiative and, in general, the BBS system. 
However, it is important that rewards are still small entity and symbolic, not to give origin 
to competitions and disagreement that can harm the project and the authenticity and 
significance of the collected data. 
 
4.2.2. Observation process 
The constant monitoring of the safety behavior data, of the observed activities and 
observability of behavior has allowed to develop and implement improvements to the 
observation process, both before and after the start of the observations. 
Data analysis has highlighted the need to take action on those items that, in proportion, 
are associated with: 
 An excessive number of "Not Observed" behavior 
 An excessive number of "Safe" behavior 
 An excessive number of "At Risk" behavior 
In this context, the activities of support to the observers during the observations gives 
possibility of significant room for improvement, allowing less experienced observers to 
further refine their ability to compile the checklist, to identify at risk behavior and to release 
feedback. The activities of support is therefore essential to fully understand the actual 
need to change the items of the checklist. 
It is essential that it is never lacking the project team and supervisors support to workers 
throughout the observation period, in order to never drop the attention on safety issues. 
 
4.2.3. Workers safety performance 
Improvement actions regarding workers safety performance will focus on observed 
behavior that result more frequently "at risk" to health and safety. 
As for these behavior, it will first have to precisely identify the causes of the absence of 
safety for each individual behavior and further intervene with different corrective action 
depending on the case. 
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The following table shows, for each department, behavior with worst performance in terms 
of risk: 
 
AREA BEHAVIOR SAFETY % 
Production and 
Packaging 
Respiratory protection 88% 
Hearing protection 88% 
Warehouse 
Use of the forklift 94% 
Hand protection 93% 
Laboratory 
Hand protection 63% 
Eye protection 57% 
Table 4.3 
Obviously observers comments give us more precise information about the nature of at 
risk behavior. Transcription and cataloging of the comments transcribed by observers 
during the observations allows to identify some areas for improvement of safety 
performance. 
  
89 
 
The following table lists some comments of interest for each department: 
AREA REPORTED COMMENT 
PRODUCTION 
AND 
PACKAGING 
 “Operator does not wear eyes protection appropriate to its operation, but simple 
eyeglasses” 
“Operator arches his back instead of flexing knees while moving bins” 
“The operator does not wear a face mask for corrosive products” 
 “Operator leaves empty bins close to the station, creating a possible risk of stumbling” 
“The operator does not wear hearing protection during washing operations” 
WAREHOUSE 
“Operator does not wear gloves while heats the nylon, with risk of burning his fingers" 
“Operator does not fasten the load to the forklift, which is thus unstable (also for the 
presence of ground holes)” 
“The load protrudes from forklift” 
“Operator does not wear the high visibility jacket because of the heat” 
“Operator ensures that the external truck driver wears PPE, but does not ensure of the 
correct loading of the pallet” 
LABORATORY 
 “Operator does not wear disposable gloves during operations in the laboratory, saying 
that after one or two uses these wear out” 
 “A jar from the production lacks appropriate labeling” 
“Operator’s  workplace is dirty and messy” 
“Operator does not perform the safety test before using the tintometer”  
“Operator does not wear the white coat while conducting laboratory analysis” 
Table 4.4 
In any case may be appropriate for the project team to conduct more in-depth interviews with 
supervisors of individual departments in order to highlight the causes of at risk behavior and work 
together on corrective measures and/or improvement. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Experimental evidence and data collected by safety excellence companies around the 
world show how the behavioral approach to workplace safety seems to be the prerequisite 
for the promotion of a safety culture at work and irreplaceable part of the process of 
organizational renewal that companies are required to make. Indeed, it is now clear to all 
operators in the field of safety management that an innovative approach to occupational 
safety management and the imperative need for the verification of the results are 
necessary conditions to translate current legislation into tangible safety results. Safety 
becomes a cultural and behavioral process to maintain and improve so that the 
application of the rules and requirements are not experienced as an imposition and 
reduced to mere implementation of the dictates of current legislation. Considering the 
excellent results obtained when it was actually applied, BBS is today a modern and 
particularly effective tool in promoting occupational health and safety development. 
The analysis and processing of data using spreadsheets, specially designed and prepared 
for the operational scenery of Resana, have enabled to highlight the very positive results 
obtained from the BBS system since its introduction to the end of the observations. 
However, going beyond the satisfactory quantitative results achieved, the introduction of 
BBS always provides a strong impetus to the diffusion, growth and consolidation of the 
corporate culture of safety, which is already well established in the context of Materis 
Paints. 
The behavioral safety system allowed to directly involve all the operators in the field, 
calling them to contend with the problems of safety management and increasing their 
ability to distinguish safe behavior from at risk behavior. Obviously the success of the 
project of Resana, as with all such projects, was made possible by the support of the 
project team, which has constantly monitored the different phases of introduction and 
supported all observers. 
After this first implementation of the system, Materis Paints Resana plant is now ready for 
any further activations of the process of behavioral safety, which may be a useful tool for 
data collection and investigation in order to develop corrective actions and improvement 
standards of health and safety. 
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APPENDIX A: OBSERVATION CHECKLIST 
 
Figure 5.1 
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Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.3 
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Figure 5.4 
  
95 
 
 
Figure 5.5 
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Figure 5.6 
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APPENDIX B: INFORMATION POSTER 
 
Figure 5.7 
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APPENDIX C: BBS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
 
Activity 
Before 
Week 
1 
Week 
2 
Week 
3 
Week 
4 
Week 
5 
Week 
6 
May 4-15 
May 18-
22 
May 25-
29 
June 1-5 
June 8-
12 
June 15-
19 
June 22-
26 
1 Plant data collect 
        
2 
Target behaviour 
definition 
        
3 
Checklist 
elaboration 
        
4 
Observers 
training 
       
5 
Observation 
scheduling and 
implementation 
       
6 
Data collect and 
analysis 
       
7 
Project 
presentation 
        
Table 5.1 
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